

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.671

17 February 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 17 February 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gérard Errera (France)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 671st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. First of all I should like on behalf of the Conference to welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, His Excellency Mr. Mohammed Said al-Sahaf, who will be the first speaker in this plenary meeting.

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Iraq, Algeria, Poland, Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran. I now call on His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Mr. Mohammed Said al-Sahaf.

Mr. AL-SAHAF (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me to present to you my congratulations on your election as President of the Conference on Disarmament. I also wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express the hope that this session will succeed in achieving its desired objectives. We are aware of the importance of this international forum for negotiations in the field of disarmament, and of the contribution it can make towards achieving tangible and balanced progress in this vital area, taking into account, before anything else, the interests and security of all members of the international community without discrimination.

The evolution of international relations during the past decade and the beginning of this decade makes it incumbent upon all members of the international community to recognize the fact that participation by all States, on an equal basis, in the promotion of the common interests of mankind is imperative. It should be participation based on the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the rules of international law and the principles of justice and fairness. Such participation should also be free from double standards and selectivity in the implementation of these provisions and rules, and should seek to promote real security and stability in all the regions of the world. No doubt the achievement of these objectives presupposes the adoption of measures and procedures for disarmament on a just and objective basis. This will ensure for all States their natural rights to security, peace and respect for their sovereignty and independence; a basis which should not permit any individual State or group of States to achieve selfish benefits and privileges at the expense of other States. Proceeding from this understanding, which is contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Iraq has been participating as an observer in the work of the Conference on Disarmament since 1989. It is also on the basis of this understanding that Iraq has adopted a position that calls for the expansion of the Conference membership to include all interested States.

In 1991, a full-scale war of aggression was launched against Iraq with the participation of armed forces in excess of half a million troops from more than 30 countries. These countries included a super-Power and some of the big Powers as well. In that war, the aggressors used all types of weapons in their arsenals, conventional, non-conventional and even internationally banned weapons. Immediately after the end of that war, my country was placed under conditions of extreme hardship both unique and unprecedented; and I feel it

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may be of benefit if I avail myself of this opportunity to apprise this Conference of these conditions in brief and within the time I am allowed.

Resolutions 687 and 715, which were adopted by the Security Council in 1991, contained a series of measures some of which were to do with the destruction of certain weapons and materials and equipment related to them, while other measures were about determining a mechanism for ongoing monitoring. In spite of the colossal and complex difficulties we have faced as a result of the untold destruction inflicted upon our people by an extensive and indiscriminate war against my country, a war in which Iraq's various civilian infrastructures constituted prime targets, we have cooperated with the Special Commission of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementing the provisions contained in resolution 687. Now, after more than three years of experience of working with the Special Commission and IAEA, it has become clear that Iraq has fulfilled its obligations under section C of resolution 687. This fact has been established in the joint minutes and reports agreed by the two sides during the four rounds of high-level talks held so far between Iraq and the Special Commission since July 1993. These rounds of talks were held in Baghdad and in New York alternately. During the fourth round of talks, which was held in New York towards the end of last year, Iraq declared its acceptance of resolution 715. Thus Iraq removed the last remaining obstacle impeding the implementation by the Security Council of paragraph 22 of resolution 687, concerning the lifting of the embargo imposed on the export of Iraqi oil and of any other goods and commodities originating in Iraq. On 3 December 1993, the President of the Security Council welcomed that development in the name of the members of the Council.

Iraq has fulfilled all its obligations provided for in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. All that remains now is for the Security Council to honour its own obligations, as provided for in paragraph 22 of resolution 687, by lifting the economic embargo which no longer has any justification, even under the Council's own resolutions. The continued imposition of the iniquitous blockade on my country constitutes irrefutable evidence of the fact that certain dominant Powers are seeking to impose upon the international community their own political positions, which are in no way consonant with the Charter of the United Nations, international law or the principles of justice and fairness. This course of conduct puts in jeopardy all efforts made by the community of nations to arrive at a fair and balanced set of rules and formulas in the field of disarmament, to establish a climate of security and stability, and to ensure the furtherance of the common interests of all member States of the international community without discrimination.

Iraq was amongst the first countries to call for the Middle East to be turned into a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. Iraq and the rest of the Arab States have also warned against the fact that Israel is already in possession of a large stockpile of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of missiles capable of carrying these weapons over great distances estimated at thousands of kilometres. Israel is still refusing to sign the non-proliferation Treaty.

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Paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 provides for the goal of "establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery". Although more than three years have now gone by since the adoption of this resolution, we have yet to see any serious step or measure taken towards the implementation of this paragraph. On the contrary, we witness an arms race feverishly pursued by certain countries in the Middle East, some of which are devoting huge efforts to the acquisition and development of weapons of mass destruction. Given this very grave situation today, aren't we entitled to wonder about the motives behind the enthusiasm shown in hounding Iraq to such an extent as to threaten it with the use of military force, and then actually using this force with extreme ferocity, while in the meantime, there is silence about what other parties are doing, even conniving at that, if not helping them with their incessant efforts to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction, as is the case with Israel? Is it not the right, and indeed the duty, of the international community and of this august Conference to ask the question: Can such biased and twisted methods and policies really ensure the achievement of security, peace and stability?

The position expressed by Iraq at the 1989 Paris Conference on chemical weapons was clear and stressed our commitment to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and our support for all international efforts made in the field of disarmament. Iraq was amongst the first States to accede to the non-proliferation treaties and conventions. Iraq has also stressed its view that any call for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons must be coupled with a similar call for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons.

Now that Iraq has fulfilled all the obligations and procedures provided for in Security Council resolution 687, we expect the international community to begin addressing the issues of security and stability in the Middle East region on an equitable basis far removed from double standards, and to demand that the Security Council implement without delay paragraph 14 of resolution 687. We also believe that this august Conference has a primary responsibility to take rapid measures to ensure the implementation of paragraph 14 of resolution 687 by turning the Middle East region into a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. This Conference must not permit certain countries, well known to all, to exploit the critical and sensitive situation currently prevailing in the region in order to achieve suspect selfish benefits, which will inevitably aggravate the imbalance and lead to a further undermining of security and stability in the region, in addition to exposing the security and interests of its peoples to extremely grave dangers.

Iraq considers the priorities listed in the document adopted by the special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1978 to be still valid. This document gave first priority to nuclear disarmament on the ground that nuclear weapons pose a grave danger to mankind and to the very existence of human civilization. The nuclear States party to the NPT bear a special responsibility in this regard. The establishment of a stable world unthreatened by devastating wars and conflicts cannot be accomplished unless we rely on fruitful cooperation, ensure that the world community is not dominated by certain Powers and that there is no interference in the internal affairs of other States, and refrain from dealing with issues on the basis of duality, selectivity and double standards.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from Arabic): I would like to welcome His Excellency Mr. Mohammed Said al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq. I remember him well when he was representing his friendly country in India. We thank him for his valuable statement, which I hope will be of benefit to all.

(continued in French)

Now that the various subsidiary bodies established by the Conference have started work or will soon do so, I would like to share with you some ideas on the question of negative security assurances, which my delegation has the honour to coordinate within the Group of 21. It is understood that these ideas are put forward on behalf of the Algerian delegation alone.

For 15 years the many aspects of the question of assurances has been considered within the Conference on Disarmament. Many delegations have made proposals and no basic obstacles seem to stand in the way of drawing up a convention text. The Algerian delegation has consistently defended the idea of a multilateral convention because, like all the non-aligned countries, my country has not been satisfied with the unilateral declarations of assurances made by the nuclear States. By their very nature they are precarious, they can be revoked at any time and they are subject only to internal developments in States. Moreover, almost all the assurances formulated so far have been vague and have a conditional character which removes any practical scope from them. In addition, the conditions in which the Security Council operates do not enable us to conclude that a declaration by that body, such as that made in 1968, could constitute a sufficient guarantee for the non-nuclear States.

Last year the delegation of a State that does not possess nuclear weapons wondered at some length whether it was fair that States voluntarily giving up the nuclear option could benefit in return from negative security assurances. It is true that that delegation represents a country which is covered by many guarantees accorded it by allied nuclear Powers. Also, last year another delegation said that most States had not followed the nuclear option simply because it was beyond their reach. We do not approve of this interpretation and we are inclined to believe instead that the non-proliferation option has in most cases been a sovereign act of political will. It is for this reason that we believe that the need for negative security assurances, the direct consequence of a choice entered into in the light of international commitments, exists, and that it is time to satisfy that need. Not through the issuing of unilateral declarations, not through the adoption of a Security Council resolution, but through the conclusion of a multilateral convention binding upon all the signatories. Such a measure would entail undeniable positive consequences and would contribute to improving international relations. It would make the policy of non-proliferation easier and more credible and would bring proof that action undertaken by nuclear-weapon States to combat the spread of such weapons does fall within the context of a global

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strategy of peace and disarmament. Need I add that my country does not see the assurances as an umbrella under which States would shelter in order to implement a policy of nuclear armament? Quite the contrary, we accept that a State wishing to be covered by negative security assurances should enter into precise non-proliferation commitments. These commitments could take different forms (accession to the NPT or a regional denuclearization treaty, agreements with IAEA, a formal act of the State enshrined in its Constitution, etc.) and be accompanied by the possibility of verification. Once these commitments are entered into, the assurances should be unconditional, unlimited in their context and their scope, legally binding and not subject to any restriction on duration other than that related to compliance by the beneficiary State with its commitments.

Ambassador Hoffmann, whose skills my delegation has already had occasion to praise when he chaired the work of another ad hoc committee last year, suggested a very interesting outline for this year's debate within the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. I should like to share with you some general ideas which this document inspires.

As regards the importance of the subject, I should like to note that the question of negative security assurances has been debated well before the drawing up of the NPT, during its negotiation and at each review conference. Some have viewed the NPT as an unfair and discriminatory treaty. It is hence legitimate to wonder whether this Treaty is designed to set in store the situation obtaining in 1968; whether it therefore constitutes the enshrining in law of a specific "right" acknowledged to be held by a group of States. It might also be thought that this is a preventive measure designed to forestall dissemination, and hence a step towards the dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons. It is this interpretation which we consider most in keeping with the spirit that obtained when the Treaty was being drawn up, and which best tallies with the goals the international community set itself in linking non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament. It is also this interpretation that enables us to say that negative security assurances constitute a right for each non-nuclear-weapon State which wishes to live without having a sword of Damocles hanging over its head. The concrete realization of this right would strengthen the credibility of the policy of non-proliferation and disarmament and would deprive its declared or undeclared detractors of all arguments. The review conference, next year, offers an opportunity to move in the right direction. It should dispel the misunderstandings and give the NPT its original meaning, one which is closely linked to the balance of the rights which States have for their security.

As regards the form that these assurances should take, we believe that the drawing up of a multilateral convention would be the best possible formula. On the one hand, such an arrangement would enable us to spell out the rights and duties of each of the parties; on the other, it could lead to a clarification of the current international strategic situation. States would

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be obliged to clarify their attitude towards the military atom. In acceding to the above-mentioned convention, they would opt to place their security in non-proliferation.

Which methodological approach should be favoured. We believe that the three possibilities proposed by Ambassador Hoffmann are not mutually exclusive. The substantive discussion of negative security assurances has already enabled us to determine the general elements of the assurances, as highlighted in several texts submitted to the Conference on Disarmament. We also recall that other proposals were to be submitted to our Conference and were then withdrawn in view of the lack of progress within the Ad Hoc Committee. These documents could very felicitously be merged in a rolling text.

As regards the content to be given to this convention text, allow me to sum up our national approach as follows. We should expressly reaffirm, firstly the commitment of States never to be the first to resort to the use or the threat of use of military force to settle their political disputes and secondly the right of States to unilateral or collective self-defence in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter, it being understood that recourse to nuclear weapons should never be considered as a legitimate response to a conventional attack.

We should include provisions concerning ways of dealing with conflicts between a non-nuclear State and a nuclear State. We should not forget that in such cases, as a result of the right of veto wielded by the nuclear States, which are the same as the permanent member States of the Security Council, the rights stemming from the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter are not guaranteed to non-nuclear States.

The assurances to be incorporated in the convention machinery should be assurances against use as well as assurances against the threat of use. Indeed, we believe that this right should be reaffirmed by any nuclear State as soon as it enters into armed conflict with a non-nuclear State covered by the guarantees. International assistance to a non-nuclear State facing a threat should include: firstly, diplomatic and political aspects (reaffirmation by the other nuclear countries of the right of the non-nuclear State to be neither threatened nor attacked, whatever their own assessment of responsibilities in the conflict under way); secondly, practical measures likely to promote strict respect for the provisions of the convention. In the event of a direct nuclear attack, it is clear that assistance could then be only health and economic assistance for the attacked State. Provision could also be made for sanctions machinery vis-à-vis the State that has used the nuclear weapon.

Who should provide these assurances? In our view, only the nuclear States within the meaning of the 1968 Treaty should have this prerogative. Any other States possessing nuclear weapons should destroy the weapons that they might have acquired in order to be eligible for negative security assurances. In the event of an attack on or threat to a non-nuclear State covered by these assurances on the part of a nuclear Power other than the

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Five, this State should benefit from international assistance at least equal to that which could be extended to it if the attack or the threat of nuclear attack came from one of the Five.

Who should benefit? The legitimate beneficiaries of these assurances should of course be, first and foremost, the States parties to the convention. Efforts should also be made to ensure that the security commitments entered into under other international agreements are not interpreted in such a manner as to restrict the scope or the field of application of the convention arrangements.

Exemptions. We can envisage only those that would stem from the refusal of States to accede to the convention, from their denouncing it, or from conduct by them contrary to the commitments entered into under the convention.

The convention should be open, in the first place, on the one hand, to the five nuclear States, which are the exclusive providers of assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and on the other to States which do not possess nuclear weapons and are not bound by military alliances with nuclear States. It is true that specific provisions could be found whereby the benefit of such assurances extended to the member States of military alliances with nuclear countries. These States should, however, be in a position to respect the terms of the convention.

As regards the verification of such a convention we see, firstly, verification that the actions of States parties are in conformity with the commitments entered into under the treaty. We could legitimately contemplate machinery for verification of the non-nuclear status of a State benefiting from the assurances, inter alia in pursuance of other international agreements.

Sanctions. The measures that can be taken should be clearly spelt out. They will, of course, differ as between a nuclear State and a non-nuclear State, because of the effects of these sanctions on the general balance of the convention: might we, for instance, envisage a non-nuclear State which is in breach being excluded from the field of application of the security assurances, but we could not do the same vis-à-vis a nuclear State.

As I said at the outset of my statement, these are a few general ideas to which my delegation accords great importance.

Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to ask you to accept the congratulations of my delegation on the occasion of your taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of its 1994 session. I would also like to tell you personally how pleased I am to see you preside over this august assembly at this crucial stage. The effective manner in which you have conducted our work has already borne fruit; this is borne out by the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has begun its work and working groups have already been set up. I would also like to express my appreciation

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to your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, for his efforts at the end of the previous session and during the inter-sessional period, efforts which made it possible to prepare the ground well for the work of our present session.

(continued in English)

I should also like to echo the greetings already addressed to the distinguished Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. In the person of Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, we salute a distinguished diplomat and a disarmament expert of repute and long standing. We are likewise happy to greet Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, the new Deputy Secretary-General. Finally, let me warmly welcome the distinguished representatives who have joined us at this table for the first time: Ambassador Meghlaoui of Algeria, Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil, Ambassador Omar of Ethiopia, Ambassador Vattani of Italy and Ambassador Tarre Murzi of Venezuela. We look forward to productive cooperation with them all. Let me also say how much we shall be missing the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador O'Sullivan. I wish him all the best in his new career.

In my intervention today, I propose to concentrate briefly on the key elements of Poland's position in respect to the CD agenda items this year, in the first place the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In due course, our views will be presented in greater detail in the more appropriate setting of the relevant ad hoc committees or other subsidiary bodies.

Let me observe at the outset how correct the Secretary-General of the United Nations was in observing in his much appreciated message to the 1994 CD session that "the changed international environment had created new opportunities for the pursuit of disarmament, while also posing new challenges". There is no need before this audience to decode the term "changed international environment", nor is it, indeed, necessary to spell out the acronyms of the landmark disarmament agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral, which have been reached due to the end of the cold war and the demise of a bipolar world. Today, we are called upon to seize that historic window of opportunity again and seek agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear test explosions for all time. With the confrontation of yesteryear replaced by cooperation today, the prospects for early progress towards this goal seem better than at any time since the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. We must do our best to make the most of these prospects.

We will all readily agree - I am sure - with the Secretary-General's view in another of his reports (CD/1176), notably that disarmament agreements "should be seen as part of the larger network of international cooperative behaviour which is designed to safeguard the security of all nations". Absolutely right. Yet - unfortunately - international security cannot be taken for granted today, notwithstanding progress in disarmament. In Europe and elsewhere, the challenges to international security are only too familiar. They range from economic, political and military instability of individual countries and regions to ethnic strife and to bloody regional conflicts whose grisly results are for everyone to see on the TV screens. Whether posed by

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aggravating instability for reviving nationalisms and xenophobia, or by the apparent appeal of insane ideas to tamper with frontiers or the Statehood of sovereign States - the challenges to international security architecture based upon freedom and democracy cannot be dismissed or taken lightly. To my country they are certainly of grave concern. They, inter alia, have led the Polish Prime Minister to Brussels to put his signature to the Partnership for Peace concept.

On the other hand, there are important positive developments which are rightly heartening to the international community. Poland joins in the general satisfaction at the recent trilateral agreement reached by the Russian Federation, the United States and Ukraine, providing for the elimination of all nuclear arms from the latter's territory. We look forward to early ratification and implementation of that crucial agreement. We also applaud Ukrainian resolve to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear State. Together with the recent accessions to the NPT of Armenia, Belarus, Guyana and Mauritania as well as the declared intention of Algeria and Argentina to follow suit, these facts testify to a remarkable momentum building up in favour of universality of the Treaty.

We have listened with great interest to the important statements made so far, especially by representatives of the nuclear-weapon Powers, on their positions concerning comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty - our top priority this year. The significance of these statements for our objectives cannot escape anyone. We study them with due care.

Turning to the views of my delegation in regard to a CTBT, I should like first to say that we share in the appreciation expressed to the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka, for his endeavours last year as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The in-depth examination of various aspects of detection and verification techniques, and the subsequent elaboration of a treaty-specific mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee for 1994, offer us a chance to proceed expeditiously to purpose-oriented work on the provisions of a multilateral treaty on the discontinuance of all nuclear tests for all time. In the view of my delegation, we will be greatly assisted in this task by the Swedish draft CTBT text with its annexed draft protocol and by the Australian working paper containing a valuable draft structural outline of such a treaty. Both these documents represent useful reference points in our work and we are grateful to Sweden and Australia for their contributions.

While a CTBT is long overdue, we can well understand the caution transpiring from suggestions that "haste should be made slowly" and that a "greater premium should be put on a good treaty than on an early one". It goes without saying that neither a good nor an early accord would be facilitated if the appeals of Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton for a continued test moratorium were to go unheeded.

The scope of a ban covering "all tests for all time" is referred to in the 1963 PTB Treaty. It seems to come close to what we should be aiming at - some 30 years later - in a CTBT viewed, first and foremost, as an effective

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non-proliferation instrument. While such an instrument - in our view - should cover "peaceful nuclear explosions" and dismiss any "threshold" idea, we find attractive and warranted arguments against extending the scope of the ban to cover also "preparatory activities". Such activities would not lend themselves to precise definition nor to easy and foolproof verification. What is certain about such a ban, however, is that it would militate against the need for verification that is cost-effective. It could, moreover, come dangerously close to tampering with the recognized principle of freedom of scientific research and interfering with legitimate peaceful activities.

The provisions on the entry into force of the future treaty should, in our view, satisfy at least two requirements. First, they should not set the entry-into-force hurdle discouragingly high, thus in effect delaying entry into effect of the treaty; and secondly entry-into-force should be conditional on mandatory support of the CTBT by the five nuclear-weapon Powers, by the recognized nuclear-capable "threshold" countries as well as by those which are known to operate research and power-generating nuclear reactors. A mandatory ratification of the future treaty by all members of the CD, especially following enlargement of its membership, would come close to meeting these requirements.

Provisions on a credible and effective verification system may pose the greatest difficulty, if only because of their sheer weight in the treaty. We believe that such a system, by and large, patterned after the CWC verification mechanism, should envisage, inter alia on-site challenge inspections and a sanctions system meaningful enough to deter would-be violators. A seismic monitoring system would, of course, stand at the core of such a mechanism. Institution-wise, a satisfactory yet financially conservative solution should be assured by a judicious marriage between the Vienna-located International Atomic Energy Agency, with its recognized experience, manpower and administrative infrastructure, and a CTBT-specific organism responsible for monitoring data exchange and the handling of related activities. The presentation by the representative of the IAEA yesterday at the NTB Ad Hoc Committee was extremely useful and we thank him for this and for the answers he gave to many questions asked by various delegations.

Let me, at this juncture, make also one observation of a more general nature. Now, we believe that while the elaboration of an effective and universally applicable CTBT, on the one hand, and the extension of the NPT for an indefinite period, on the other, represent but two sides of the same broader issue of non-proliferation, these goals should be sought on their own merits. Any attempts at establishing whatever artificial linkage between them would be certainly unhelpful. At the same time, of course, it would be less than realistic to deny the existence of a clear feedback relationship between them.

The proposed ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices should be seen as the last aspect of the non-proliferation triad. The issue of the "cut-off" is a legitimate subject for the Conference on Disarmament to deal with. We welcome its inclusion in our agenda. Following an exploratory stage of open-ended

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consultations, and if warranted by their results, an Ad Hoc Committee should be established to proceed to the elaboration of a suitable draft agreement. The International Atomic Energy Agency should be entrusted with responsibility in regard to its verification.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons has, unfortunately, been unable so far to make significant headway, despite a suitable mandate. Hopefully, the existing political difficulties will be removed soon, as they should, and tangible progress will be possible in 1994. In this connection we take note with interest of the readiness of the Russian Federation to open consultations among the five nuclear-weapon Powers on a possible joint formula of "negative" assurances. We believe also that the precedent-setting example of security guarantees extended to Ukraine deserves careful examination within the context of efforts to arrive at a multilateral instrument of a legally binding character.

The Polish delegation is encouraged by the results scored by the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space last year. They leave no doubt that confidence-building measures offer the most promising avenue to reaching an accord, or accords, in that area. Purpose-oriented work in this respect would be rendered more rewarding by a mandate somewhat broader than the one under which the Ad Hoc Committee worked until last September.

Poland attaches major importance to the question of transparency in armaments as well as to the issue of confidence-building in the military sphere in general, issues which owing to the positive CSCE experience have for us a special meaning. Thanks to the well-structured debate in the Ad Hoc Committee last year and to the many specific constructive proposals submitted by a number of delegations, that subsidiary organ is now better prepared to pursue the goal of enhanced transparency. Congratulating the distinguished representative of Hungary, Ambassador Boytha, on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, we pledge him full support and constructive cooperation.

In our view, the process of increasing military transparency should be both gradual and non-discriminatory so as to promote and encourage its universal appeal and participation in it. Given this consideration, we are positively disposed towards sustained efforts with a view to developing and expanding the scope of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. In this respect, the proposals submitted last year by France and the United Kingdom seem to be particularly relevant. We also look forward to the results of the meetings of a group of experts, chaired by our distinguished friend and colleague Ambassador Wagenmakers and mandated to explore the possible expansion of both quality and quantity of data in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. We take note of his invitation to delegations for useful input of the CD for the benefit of the group of experts. My delegation shall comply in due course.

In concluding my statement, let me comment briefly on the all-important question of the enlargement of the CD membership. We are very appreciative of

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Ambassador O'Sullivan's strenuous efforts as special coordinator last year. His broadly supported recommendations regrettably failed to gain consensus. The commendable inter-sessional endeavours of Ambassador Zahran have also been to no avail. We regret that, as a result, the delegations concerned could not take their seats in the CD. The latest initiative of the delegation of Mexico would have had our support, on the condition of its acceptability to the interested parties. We should like to trust that the contemplated consultation process will lead to a satisfactory solution and that the day when the 23 delegations take their seats as full-fledged CD members will not be unduly delayed. Indeed, it should not be delayed, if only because of what is at stake - the missed benefit of their equitable participation in the CTBT negotiating process now, and risking their critically important support of the accord, once it is in place.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and the kind words he addressed to me, which I particularly appreciated coming from a country with which France has always maintained particularly cordial relations. I now give the floor to the representative of Turkey, Mr. Arar.

Mr. ARAR (Turkey) (translated from French): Mr. President, as this is the first time that my delegation is taking the floor under your presidency, I would like to begin my statement by expressing to you our appreciation of the manner in which you have been conducting the work of this Conference. We are sure that your well-recognized skills in the field of disarmament have played a paramount role in the speed with which this Conference has been able to commence its activities at the beginning of this annual session. Relations between France and Turkey will soon be celebrating their five-hundredth anniversary. Begun in a spirit of cooperation by Francis I and Suleyman the Magnificent in the sixteenth century, these relations have often been based on cooperation, have sometimes taken a turn towards rivalry or were torn by war. But they have always had a specific character and have always been enriching. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to pay a renewed tribute to your country.

Turkey expresses its wish to become a full-fledged member and to contribute actively to the accomplishment of the tasks of the Conference on Disarmament. It is time to explain why Turkey wishes to become a member of this body.

The world is undergoing transformation, interaction with regional changes. On the one hand, the international community would like to believe in a hope for peace built on political solidarity and economic cooperation leading to a more prosperous way of life. On the other hand, it must identify the risks and tackle the obstacles which impede the realization of these aspirations. The gulf between the concept of a new world order and a harsh post-cold-war reality is growing progressively. This gulf, with its inherent dangers, is flagrant in the regions around Turkey. At the crossroads of the most troubled regions of the world - the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean - Turkey has been able to create a refuge of stability, democracy and secularism. The

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Eastern Mediterranean, cradle of several civilizations, is a source of inspiration and a place of predilection for monotheistic religions. It is a sea in which continents meet. Throughout its history humanity has witnessed innumerable power struggles for control of this sea. Today the problems are different. The problem of the Middle East, which dates back half a century, has left its effects in the region. The differences among the inhabitants are of all kinds. Economic difficulties assail countries with growing populations. The nature of the political regimes in these countries displays substantial differences. Five NATO countries, with democratic systems and advanced economies, including the least developed among them, have a coastal zone in the northern Mediterranean. As for the coastal States of the southern and eastern Mediterranean, they reflect economic and political contradictions. This situation is a threat to peace. If the enthusiasm and hope invested in the peace process in the Middle East is not illusory, we can envisage from this historic turning-point cooperation on an extended regional scale leading to the triggering of dynamic processes which could transform this entire zone, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, into an area of peace and prosperity.

It is undeniable that the recent international changes have altered traditional geopolitical structures and have redefined a new approach. The concept of "Eurasia", in particular, deserves a reassessment: the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the confluence of newly independent States with different cultural and ethnic traditions around the Black Sea and in the Balkan, Caucasus and Central Asian regions have established new parameters for cooperation or for conflict. The Balkans have been described as the power-keg of Europe and considered as the "Middle East" of this continent. History has confirmed that Europe cannot achieve stability as long as Balkan security is not assured. Today, the Balkans have again become the most unstable part of Europe. After the disintegration of ex-Yugoslavia, ambitions in the service of a greater Serbia, genocide and ethnic cleansing inflicted upon Bosnian Muslims represent a risk that the conflict will spread to the neighbouring countries. After the dismantling of the Soviet Union, which shared a common border with Turkey, the trend towards the disintegration that has become apparent in the Caucasus region has not yet abated. Ethno-nationalism, aggression, armed conflict and invasion have seriously jeopardized the already fragile peace and stability in this region. Long-term interests and civilized options for the formation of a prosperous and peaceful region were regrettably sacrificed to military opportunism and short-term political adventures.

Turkey, located as it is between the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian zones, and hence displaying exclusive geopolitical features, is endowed with considerable historical experience that can contribute to the reduction of differences between the countries of this political and economic conglomeration. It so happens that Turkey is the only country that is a member, on the one hand, of the Council of Europe, NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and, on the other, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Organization for Economic Cooperation (which is a regional body) and the Black Sea Cooperation Council. Turkey also enjoys close relations with the European Union, with which it will

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be establishing a customs union as of 1995, and also maintains links with the Western European Union. The specific and exclusive characteristic of our country and hence its success is its ability to harmonize Islam and democracy through a secular approach.

International relations can no longer be pursued effectively without addressing the issues of arms control and disarmament with the necessary vigilance. It is clear that in the absence of necessary measures, armament efforts, as history has shown, can only engender new conflicts. Arms control and disarmament are therefore valuable means to establish and maintain peace. Turkey has striven to pursue the objectives of disarmament and arms control even during the cold war years. With the beginning of a new era in relations among States, Turkey seeks to become involved in disarmament negotiations with the ambition of contributing to universal peace. Being located at the heart of this chessboard that I have just referred to, we are aware of the role that we have to play, both in our corner of the world and at the international level, to contribute to the strengthening of security. This justifies the reasons why my country upholds its right to membership of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference, being the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, has important and urgent matters to deal with on its agenda. The negotiations which have just begun on the nuclear-test-ban treaty are a topical example. The urgent need to conclude a multilaterally negotiated and universally verifiable treaty, which, if it is to be effective, must enjoy universal participation, fully justifies the need for expansion of the Conference on Disarmament. It would therefore be irrational to have stated before the Conference that this future treaty should be signed and ratified, aside from the recognized nuclear Powers, by the threshold States and also by those which possess nuclear power or research facilities, without taking into consideration that most of these States have no opportunity to participate as full partners in the negotiations. It would be illogical to invite some of these States to participate in the future seismic network, stipulating that their incorporation in the system is of capital importance for future compliance with the treaty, without taking account of the fact that they possess no right to participate in the decision-making process. It would be unfair to seek to share the rights and duties fairly among all the parties to the treaty without that fairness being established to allow possible States parties to participate legitimately in the decision-making machinery when those rights and obligations are negotiated. My delegation has repeated several times before this august body that if the Conference on Disarmament intends to maintain its credibility, it must spare no effort to adapt itself to the changes that have occurred in the world. These changes, whose effects are far-reaching, are sufficiently compelling that the member countries should abandon the illusory prestige of belonging to a select club. Otherwise, many countries which for a long time have wished to participate in this work will inevitably lose their motivation and as a result the credibility of the Conference will be jeopardized, coupled with a reluctance to accede to the instruments prepared by it. Turkey, since it is prepared to contribute as best it can to the work of the Conference, is profoundly disappointed and

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frustrated by the outcome of the last session, when an extraordinary opportunity for the expansion of this body was not grasped.

The expansion of the Conference on Disarmament presupposes a realistic and honest approach. We must take into account the needs of the Conference for the active continuation of its work, the interest shown by countries wishing to join and also the equitable distribution of seats among the regional groups. Against these yardsticks, the list submitted last year by Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia strikes an excellent balance. Since the work has unfortunately not been completed, this list, kept as it is, should constitute a point of departure in the future consultations.

The difficulty for us lies in the objection against Israel and Iraq, both of which are on the list. It is unrealistic at the present time to conceive of an expansion of the membership of the Conference without the participation of Israel and Iraq. Israel is one of the principal players in the peace process in the Middle East. This peace process is unthinkable without taking into account disarmament and arms control. The correlation to be established between the nuclear capability of Israel and its membership of the Conference should provide not for its exclusion but its admission to this body. It would be erroneous to think that Israel is the only country in the region which has not yet adhered to the NPT. I would like to point out that on numerous bilateral and multilateral occasions Turkey has invited Israel to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and to place its facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards regime. We really think that its admission would be conducive to progress towards this objective. As for Iraq, a country which has been over armed, another important Middle East State, it is subject to sanctions applied in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations Security Council. Inspections conducted on its territory are aimed at disarming it. In principle, it would therefore be natural for this country to be included in the new membership of the Conference on Disarmament. However, it is understandable, in the case of a country to which the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter have been applied, to envisage its temporary exclusion from certain United Nations bodies in order to subject it to diplomatic isolation, while a linkage is established between the raising of sanctions and its full participation in the work of those bodies. In the case of Iraq's participation in the activities of the CD, we are of the view that the Legal Office of the United Nations would be able to formulate a proposal that would be perfectly acceptable to all parties.

To be sure, putting into effect the expansion of the membership of the Conference is no easy responsibility. My delegation supports the idea of appointing a special coordinator for this purpose. We are convinced that the coordinator whom you will designate during your presidency will have all the necessary powers to conduct an assessment of the needs of the Conference, an analysis of the interest displayed by the countries applying for full-fledged membership and an outline of the equitable distribution of seats. He must of course retain what has been achieved in the past in the field of expansion. We look forward to his appointment as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Turkey for his statement and the very kind words he addressed to me, which moved me deeply. I particularly appreciated the reminder of the long-standing relations between our two countries. In turn I should like to greet the representative of a friendly country and ally playing such an important role in the international arena. I now call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Nasseri.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): First, I wish to welcome His Excellency Mr. Mohammed Said al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, with whom I have had the pleasure of being acquainted during my visits to Baghdad in the years we were negotiating peace between our two countries, and I recall the positive role and contribution he was always prepared to make and to play for the process of peace and for the evolving relationships between our two countries.

For years, the international community has been calling for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. This is indeed a disarmament issue that came to birth almost at the same time as did nuclear weapons. Thirty years ago, there was the apparent conclusion that one has to settle, for the time being, for only a partial ban so that, at least, space and the ocean beds would be excluded from testing. Today, finally, we have come to a point - keeping our fingers crossed - that a comprehensive test ban seems at reach. The Conference on Disarmament has an important task ahead of it in negotiating and concluding a treaty. Yet the enthusiasm has been marred, at times, by several conditionings and linkages raised at the very outset of negotiations. Even at this very early stage, we, the non-nuclear-weapon States, feel the pressure and duress building up in and around negotiations.

It is fine to derive from all this that we need to move forward and fast and to conclude a treaty urgently and during the shortest possible time. There are many dangers on the way that threaten the fate of negotiations. At the same time, though, one cannot take comfort in having to negotiate and feel that positions, including essential positions, may be compromised to avoid a situation that negotiations would be harmed, or ceased.

It is true, of course, that the non-nuclear-weapon States are the strong proponents of the nuclear test ban and that they are most keen to see the negotiations succeed. But it is not fair that this sense of eager enthusiasm be misinterpreted and abused.

The approach which has generally been followed so far gives the impression that nuclear-weapon States are making a huge sacrifice to have merely committed themselves to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. As such, they have attempted to set, in various ways, the terms of negotiations. It is also implied that the objective, the main target I should say, is to stop any possible nuclear test by those who are on the verge of becoming nuclear. It seems the nuclear-weapon States believe that a special situation should be reserved only for them; that what is done by them is not a source of concern for others and that they should deal with their nuclear weapons and whatever

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relates to it within their own set of coordinates. The impression is given that the threat that needs to be contained is that of the possible newcomers, those on the threshold.

We are all aware that the CTBT is a non-proliferation scheme intended both to avert vertical as well as horizontal proliferation. We are also aware that no commitments to nuclear disarmament are yet made. In fact, even an intention for complete nuclear disarmament is not yet registered despite the enormous changes in international relations following the cold war. We do not, nevertheless, agree to the notion that the threat is limited to the emerging nuclear-weapon States and to horizontal proliferation. Indeed, we non-nuclear-weapon States see this exercise as only a step towards nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is the cardinal objective. Everything else finds meaning only under its shadow; be it the CTBT, PTBT, NPT, START, test-ban moratoriums or the prohibition of fissile materials for nuclear-weapon purposes. In fact, it is for this reason that we, the non-nuclear-weapon States, welcome such negotiations; that we will move one step towards nuclear disarmament and that we remove the reasons cited for the maintenance of nuclear weapons one after the other.

We see the test ban as the last hurdle to overcome. We shall soon expect a time-bound framework for complete and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. We therefore wish to invite nuclear-weapon States to take more prudence into the conditions, the restraints they are putting forward.

Before we start negotiations we have been told that there will be no entry into force unless all nuclear-weapon States and all those on the threshold join in. The suggestion has then been made that the moment a new nuclear-weapon State emerges, the negotiations will stop and thus the Treaty will fail to exist. We have also been told that the negotiations may be arrested if, despite the prevailing moratorium, a nuclear test is carried out. At the same time, calls for exceptional provisions are already on the table.

A provision for nuclear tests for "safety purposes" for the nuclear States is being requested; "safety", I believe, meaning the ability to keep the current stockpiles of nuclear weapons operational, properly targeted and risk-free. On this, I must say, if there is to be any special provision, it should be one that would be accorded to all equally. We cannot start the CTBT while already contemplating privileges and exceptionalities. The CTBT, by its scope, must be comprehensive and non-discriminatory and on the basis of equal rights and responsibilities.

On the current moratorium on testing it has been stated that it must hold, and hold perfectly, if negotiations are not to collapse. Of course, we too believe in the significance of this moratorium and believe too that it should not be broken. It should, instead, be extended indefinitely and should include a solid commitment from all nuclear-weapon States. Other States, particularly those on the threshold, also should refrain from testing. It is, therefore, understandable to interpret such positions as a means to deter possible new testing. But it is inconceivable that the negotiations should,

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in reality, be hostage to someone's failure to observe the moratorium. These negotiations have their own virtue and should not be threatened by events here and there.

As to the conditions raised for the entry into force, if they are aimed as a lever to ensure universality, one may find merit in them. Indeed, these are conditions that would be extremely useful if they are set forth solemnly in relation to the NPT. It will be a big boost to the NPT to state, firmly, that it would only be extended if and only if all nuclear-weapon States, as well as all those on the threshold, join and remain fully committed to it, and to amend the Treaty in such a way that it would be nullified the moment a new nuclear-weapon State emerged. The raison d'être of the NPT is to forbid the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States. This has not been the case. Therefore, such firmness may indeed prove to serve the NPT and its survival well.

On the question of the relationship or, more properly said, the linkage between a CTBT and the NPT we have heard various statements. In the report of the Conference on Disarmament to the forty-eighth General Assembly it was stated that a number of non-nuclear-weapon States view the successful outcome of the CTBT as decisive to the fate, to any extension of the NPT. We have heard, on the other hand, from some nuclear-weapon States that the CTBT will not even be negotiated if the extension of the NPT could not be guaranteed. I believe we can conclude from this, as a shared position supported by all, that the CTBT and NPT are interlinked and the conclusion, extension, success and survival of any one depends fully on the other. It should not any more be a question of which comes first, the chicken or the egg. We need and require both. One cannot be without the other.

I would attempt now to present our views on some other issues relevant to the negotiations on the CTBT. On verification, I believe, we must first concentrate on the current situation and the sort of nuclear tests that we have seen so far. To focus on future possibilities in nuclear tests complicates our work. It is, yet, something that we need to bear in mind. As we want a foolproof treaty and a long-lasting one, we may be compelled to envisage the impact from the advance of technology in the future. We cannot even disregard, outright, the possibility of a simulated nuclear test by supercomputers. But, again, we must be cautious not to lose focus, not to make things more complex and move within a framework that will keep the treaty feasible, promptly achievable and realizable.

It appears that the seismic network is the only viable and ready-to-use option as the core of the verification. Other mechanisms may gradually be applied as complementary, but it is essential that any such mechanisms should be under international control.

As regards the organization for the implementation of the treaty, if IAEA is to be entrusted with this task, it should not only become technically prepared, but it needs as well to make adjustments in its decision-making structure. These adjustments are, incidentally, also needed for the extension

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of the NPT; adjustments that would enhance the role of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT and to the eventual CTBT and give them priority in its main decision-making body vis-à-vis the non-members.

On the suggestion to prohibit preparations, the idea as we understand is to foresee measures against preparations the moment they are detected and reported. This is a matter that deserves further study. Logic has it that if one is preparing for a test, why should others wait until the hand is on the trigger and not move to stop it in advance? The problem lies, on the other hand, in how to define preparations, how to trace them, who should report them, who will decide, how one avoids abusive reports.

It is clear that many complications and complexities stand in our way if the idea of prohibiting preparations is taken up. The idea, however, guides us to think more seriously about the existing sites. No doubt if any State has any site available for nuclear tests it remains only one step from the test itself. We should, in our endeavour, examine how we can best deal with this question. I believe one possible approach is to request all parties to declare the sites that have been used or are ready to be used for nuclear testing as well as the specifically designed equipment contained in them. We may decide then that such equipment must be destroyed under verification and the site must be closed.

On the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, arguments have been raised that no such thing exists and that any nuclear test can have a military application. Our objective is, of course, to have a comprehensive treaty, one that leaves no loophole. As such, we are inclined towards a position that no test of whatsoever nature would be permitted. We are, none the less, apprehensive about the notion of duality of use. A notion prevalent in the developed world that if there is an intention, almost anything with a peaceful use may be diverted for military application and, therefore, must be monitored, controlled or banned. We have had devastating experience in this regard. We have suffered. In the chemical field we saw this notion shaped into export limitations on many chemicals beyond what the CWC provided for. In the BWC, many substances, necessary ingredients for vaccines and serums, have been controlled under the pretext of dual use. In the nuclear arena, the situation has been much, much worse. Technology and material related to peaceful use have been heavily curtailed despite clear commitments for their accessibility in the NPT. Indeed, it has become a matter of course for the developed countries in the fields of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological technology that the developing countries should be deprived of many things perceived by them to have dual use. It is this persistent noting that makes us hesitate on what is now being suggested about the prohibition of all nuclear tests including peaceful ones. This is an issue, therefore, that should be extensively elaborated and carefully examined before it is concluded.

What I have just presented reflects our general views on the CTBT at this inaugurating phase of negotiations. We shall proceed to participate in negotiations with a view to conclude the convention at the earliest possible time. Hence, alongside the NPT, PTBT and other non-proliferation treaties, we will have curbed further vertical and horizontal proliferation and will be better-equipped to aim directly at nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): That brings us to the end of the list of speakers for today. I understand that another representative wishes to take the floor. I therefore give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I had not intended to ask for the floor this morning but unfortunately the outlandish intervention by the Foreign Minister of Iraq that we were subjected to as the first order of business here today requires a response.

First of all, I should like to remind the Minister that what he describes as a "war of aggression launched against Iraq in 1991" was, as all the world knows, a military operation undertaken by the international community with the full support of the United Nations Security Council and designed simply to put an end to Iraq's own acts of aggression the previous year against a small and friendly neighbour. So, instead of standing truth on its head, let us review a few facts.

Iraq, on 26 November 1993, informed the United Nations Security Council that it had formally accepted the Security Council's resolution 715 adopted unanimously in October 1991. In so doing, Iraq expressed its expectation that the United Nations would move to lift sanctions imposed after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. We have heard that same extraordinary demand repeated here this morning. Iraq's acceptance of Security Council resolution 715 is more than two years overdue and, thus far, it is purely declaratory. In this regard, we note that Iraq accepted United Nations Security Council resolution 687 within one week of its adoption in April 1991 but since then the Iraqi record of non-compliance speaks for itself. Iraq must establish a sound record of full, sustained cooperation with a long-term monitoring regime. Details of this regime are still to be developed by the United Nations Special Commission and by IAEA. We see no reason now, or in the foreseeable future, for the United Nations to consider modifying the sanctions regime. UNSCOM's Executive Chairman, Rolf Ekéus, has made clear, in recent reports to the Security Council, that Iraq remains in violation of provisions of resolution 687 relating to the destruction of weapons-of-mass-destruction programmes. Remaining gaps in our understanding of these programmes involving, for example, potentially 100 unaccounted-for Scud missiles, are serious and must be resolved. Iraq remains in violation of all other elements of resolution 687 relating, for example, to the sanctity of the Kuwait/Iraqi border, compensation to victims, return of or accounting for missing persons, return of property and renunciation of terrorism. Iraq remains in violation of all other United Nations Security Council resolutions passed in connection with its invasion of Kuwait and subsequent defeat by the coalition, notably Security Council resolution 688, which calls on Baghdad to end repression of its own citizens. The record shows that since the end of the Gulf war, Iraq has systematically sought to avoid or modify the requirements imposed on it by the international community, to comply with those requirements grudgingly and incompletely only when the international community made it clear that there was no alternative, and to roll back even steps taken to comply with its obligations when given the chance to do so. The burden of proof remains on Iraq to demonstrate a good-faith willingness to meet the requirements which

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have been imposed upon it. The evidence unfortunately suggests that Baghdad's aim remains what it has always been - to avoid those requirements and to reestablish as quickly as possible the capability to threaten its neighbours and to repress its own people. Against this background it is clear that the international community should insist on a very high standard in assessing Iraq's acceptance of resolution 715. The resolution sets out a highly intrusive, comprehensive regime to ensure that Iraq cannot clandestinely resume its weapons-of-mass-destruction programmes. The international community should support vigorous efforts by UNSCOM and IAEA to establish such a regime on a firm and sustainable basis. In light of Iraq's record of reneging on its commitments, a lengthy period of full and verified compliance and cooperation with the regime will be essential to demonstrate its workability and sustainability. It is difficult to see how such a track record could be credibly established in under a year from the time the regime is up and running.

It should be clear from the above that we consider any discussion now of lifting sanctions to be grossly premature. To the extent that Iraq's decision to accept United Nations Security Council resolution 715 is a significant step, it is clear that it would never have occurred had not the international community stood firm on the importance of Iraq's meeting the requirements imposed by the United Nations. A clear, consistent message that the community of nations would settle for nothing short of full compliance with relevant United Nations resolutions is the surest means of guaranteeing that Iraq's acceptance of United Nations resolution 715 will be translated into meaningful actions and that the international community's determination that Iraq should cease to be a threat to peace and its own citizens will be realized.

Mr. AL-KHERO (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): I am sorry that my country's delegation has requested the floor again. I wish to emphasize that the statement by my country's Minister for Foreign Affairs is clear and explicit and deals with facts that might not be to the liking of the representatives of some States that are ill-disposed towards Iraq. I do not wish to speak at length, like the delegations of a number of member States, preferring to preserve a harmonious atmosphere in keeping with the status of a distinguished forum such as the Conference on Disarmament. My country's delegation reserves the right to reply at a later time.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Iraq. Does no other delegation wish to take the floor? I would now like to take up an issue regarding the organization of the work of the Conference. You will recall that during the plenary meeting of 1 February, the Conference decided to appoint Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. In the meantime Ambassador Hoffmann has been designated Chairman of the Working Group on Verification of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Consequently, the Group of Western States, whose turn it is to chair the Committee on negative security assurances, Ambassador Alain Guillaume of Belgium for the chairmanship of that Committee. May I take it that the Conference decides to accept this proposal?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I take this opportunity to express our sincere congratulations to Ambassador Guillaume upon his appointment to this post and wish him every success in his duties.

With respect to the only remaining pending issue, namely the expansion of the membership of the Conference, I wish to inform the Conference that at this stage no consensus exists concerning the proposals presented respectively by Mexico, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America. Nor is there a consensus on the appointment of a special coordinator to deal with this issue. Consequently the Conference will have to find an appropriate way of progressing in this area.

As usual, the secretariat has distributed the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. The timetable has been drawn up in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees and may be amended as needed. If there are no objections, I will take it that this timetable is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): With your permission I would now like to say a few words in closing. My term of office as President is coming to an end. I do not intend to embark on an assessment of the results we have arrived at in the course of the last few weeks. Like each of you, I am pleased that the Conference has been able to decide on its agenda expeditiously for this session, to establish the ad hoc committees on a nuclear test ban, prevention of an arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and transparency in armaments. Likewise, we have happily been able to appoint two special coordinators entrusted respectively with the question of fissile material and the updating of the agenda of the Conference. The Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has begun its work promptly and set up its two working groups. All this is positive and it shows that where there is a will, problems can be overcome.

The question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference remains at a standstill. In September 1993 the Conference was not able to adopt the recommendations made by the special coordinator at the time. On 27 January last, Ambassador Zahran was compelled to note that consensus could not be reached on the issue. The proposal submitted by the delegation of Mexico has not succeeded in gaining consensus, any more than two other proposals submitted since. Finally, even the appointment of a special coordinator, the principle of which was contained in the presidential statement adopted on 25 January last, encountered opposition. The Conference will have to draw its conclusions from this situation, which is particularly regrettable. Firstly for the candidate countries which are waiting, and some have been waiting for many years, and they increasingly have the feeling that they are knocking on the door of a forum that does not hear them, whereas each of its members, day in day out, stresses the importance of this problem and the urgent need to resolve it. This situation is also detrimental to the credibility of the Conference, as regards both its representativeness and its ability to take new realities into account. If I may express a wish, it is that the Conference

(The President)

should, before it is too late, find its way out of the world of make-believe and shoulder its responsibilities. There is no doubt that the truth would then appear. This would be a mark of consideration for the candidate countries. It is a vital necessity for the future of the Conference.

I would not wish to conclude without reiterating my gratitude to the group coordinators and the delegation of China for their constant availability and the support they have given me. My warm thanks also go to the secretariat, and most particularly to Mr. Bensmail and his colleagues for the exemplary, friendly and effective manner in which they have helped us to do our job. Finally, I wish Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany every success in the task he will be taking up as of next week, and I should like to assure him of my full cooperation.

We have just completed our order of business for today. Consequently, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. Before adjourning I would like to call on the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Guillaume.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): I am extremely honoured by the confidence which the CD has shown in appointing me Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances. I can assure the members of the Conference that I will do my utmost to achieve progress in this delicate but vital area. However, in the short term, given the recent nature of the decision which concerns me, I would crave the Conference's indulgence for my first decision, which is to defer the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee by eight days. I plan to follow the momentum of Ambassador Hoffmann and look forward to a general debate next week based on the elements that had already been distributed to you by the German delegation.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The next plenary meeting of the Conference will take place on Thursday, 24 February 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.672

24 February 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 24 February 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wolfgang Hoffmann (Germany)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 672nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the beginning of my presidency I feel very comfortable to state that all the CD's ad hoc committees and their respective sub-bodies are established and have started working. The special coordinators for the question of the issue of the prohibition of the production of fissile material, for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices (the "cut-off" coordinator) and the modernization of the agenda are nominated. The prompt and smooth start of this year's session is a promising sign that the Conference on Disarmament does live up to the challenges we have to tackle this year. I will elaborate on that later on.

The merit of the smooth resuming of this Conference's work goes to my predecessor, my esteemed colleague Ambassador Errera of France. In his customary subtle and inventive manner he succeeded in settling the Conference on its tracks at a crucial stage. This did not go without saying. It took a lot of patient work of consultations and - at the right moment - friendly pressure. Apart from his diplomatic skills, the former President, Ambassador Errera, succeeded because he was respected as a true mediator solely dedicated to the common goal of preserving and enhancing the unique role of the CD as a negotiating body.

We set ourselves ambitious goals and we rightly did so. We have started serious work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and I am impressed by the manifest will of participants in the negotiations to make rapid progress. Consultations have begun to determine the role of the CD in the area of the cut-off that might lead to negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the production of certain fissile material. The Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will hopefully be able to make decisive progress in accordance with its mandate. The Conference on Disarmament is the natural forum for the negotiation of all these treaties.

This year's agenda of the Conference on Disarmament coincides with the objectives my Government has long been advocating. I have already made it clear in previous sessions that my delegation wishes to contribute to successful and constructive negotiations on the issues aforementioned. It is along this line of thinking that I accepted with great pleasure the chairmanship of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee's Working Group on Verification. However, it is for the same reason that I eventually had to give up the chairmanship of the NSA Ad Hoc Committee you originally entrusted me with. The questions relating to negative security assurances are also a very important issue and should not be dismissed as a second-ranking question. They should be dealt with the full attention of a chairman not committed to other functions within the CD. That is why I can only welcome my esteemed colleague Ambassador Guillaume as the new Chairman of the NSA Ad Hoc Committee. It is a matter of course that my delegation will try to assist him in his endeavour to find an agreement on this very crucial issue.

(The President)

Unfortunately the picture I have painted of the Conference on Disarmament is too idyllic to be totally true. We have failed so far to solve the painful problem of the extension of membership. I think everybody will subscribe to the objective that we have to extend the CD's membership soon if the CD really wants to comply with the role of a universal negotiating body. This is particularly evident in view of the forthcoming negotiation of a CTBT. I understand the mounting frustration and anger of States who in vain have been applying for membership for years. The actual deadlock is by no means the failure of my predecessors, Ambassador Errera and Ambassador Zahran, quite the contrary. They went out of their way to find any conceivable solution. I only can pursue their efforts and I will do my very best in my presidency to explore any avenue of a possible solution to this deadlock. In this context I want to associate myself with the wish the outgoing President addressed to this plenary on 17 February 1994 in his closing remarks saying that all of us have to take our responsibility soon and should do so in due respect of the candidate States. We should bear in mind that the future of the Conference on Disarmament is at stake.

I hope I can contribute to the performance of the Conference on Disarmament and I am glad I can count on the help and assistance of the secretariat, in particular Mr. Bensmail and his staff.

I intend first of all to give the floor to the delegations inscribed on the list of speakers for today, and thereafter I propose to take up the requests for participation in the work of the Conference from the following non-member States: Ecuador and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Australia, the Netherlands and Canada. As you are aware, this will be the last plenary meeting at which Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia will be present among us, since he has been recalled to his capital to take up new and important functions. I hardly need stress the importance of the contribution that Ambassador O'Sullivan has made to the work of our Conference. I am sure you will all remember and appreciate the very active and effective role he played on behalf of his Government in moving the process of negotiation which led to the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention. In fact, the tabling of the Australian draft convention at an important political time was perhaps a turning-point in our common efforts to finalize a text acceptable to all. Moreover, in the very final stage of these negotiations, Ambassador O'Sullivan played a crucial role in developing consensus on two vital articles of the Convention. More recently, Ambassador O'Sullivan was entrusted with the very difficult and delicate task of conducting consultations on the expansion of membership of the Conference, and I am sure you will all agree with me that the dynamic and imaginative way in which he discharged this task will be remembered by all of us. Of course, our best parting gift to him would have been an agreement on expansion, but I am confident that his legacy will continue to be a tribute to his diplomatic skills and determination. I know I speak on behalf of all of you when I extend to Ambassador O'Sullivan and his wife Merrilyn our very best wishes for their future happiness and success in Australia.

(The President)

I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador O'Sullivan.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): Mr. President, I am a little bit intimidated by your introduction, and I might say that I am also intimidated by the practice which grew up under your predecessor of having some opening words in the language of the President of the Conference. Since my German is even worse than my French, I hope you will forgive me for not saying something to you in your own language. Perhaps before I begin my statement, I might also recall in that context that there was once in this room, 60 years ago, an Australian representative to the League of Nations, Sir Ryrie Granville, who was an earnest farmer from the wheatfields of New South Wales who was made High Commissioner in London and came here to be our representative at the League's deliberations; and in those days it was considered not only elegant but also necessary to speak in French. I do not know exactly what French training he had had, but at the time the French representative in the Conference at the League of Nations was Monsieur Briand, who later went on to be French Foreign Minister and then Prime Minister, and there is a famous scene in one of our archives that describes Monsieur Briand's reaction of uncontrolled laughter with tears pouring down his cheeks as Sir Ryrie Granville addressed the Conference in French. For this reason, you will excuse me if I proceed in English.

Mr. President, let me congratulate you on your assumption of duties as the leader of this Conference and assure you of the full support of my delegation. I would like to welcome our new colleagues, Ambassador Meghlaoui of Algeria, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau of Argentina, Ambassador Omar of Ethiopia, Ambassador Vattani of Italy and Ambassador Murzi of Venezuela and to join in the expressions of good wishes to those who have recently concluded their assignments here.

Since in all probability this will be the last time I will have the honour to address the Conference, I would like to make some general observations about the work we are engaged in here.

A major factor in influencing what is possible now in the Conference on Disarmament is the way the disappearance of cold war certainties plays out in a negotiating context. In the period of the cold war, security (via the accumulation of military assets) was seen as tantamount to stability. By contrast constant change is a major characteristic of many politico-military relationships now. And the pace of change is likely to intensify over time because in a multipolar world, nations will make more varied calculations about how to advance their security interests. In thinking about how to achieve and maintain security in completely new circumstances, many questions arise about the extent to which standing armies, large nuclear stockpiles and their delivery systems or even rapidly deployable forces can address contemporary security problems in the disorderly post-cold-war scene.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

As well as constant change it is obvious that, for much of the world, violence and confusion have accompanied the ending of the cold war because of the end of the stabilizing bipolar hegemony and of the release of various ethnic, political, religious and economic grievances.

The Conference on Disarmament, like many other aspects of international life, has been released from the cold war constraints and, for the first time, can get down to its task of negotiating arms control and disarmament agreements. It has managed to deal with one category of weapons of mass destruction, the Convention banning chemical weapons, and is now turning its attention to two others: the ban on testing nuclear devices and the ban on production of fissile material for making nuclear weapons. Beyond these particular matters there are other items of interest on the CD's agenda: finding a binding legal instrument to give security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons; and efforts to get some sort of handle on the unrestrained and massive flows of conventional arms.

Thus the CD is well placed to address the problems of the spread of nuclear and other weapons by contributing legal agreements that shore up the existing non-proliferation regime and that create norms of international behaviour. No treaty, of course, can guarantee political choices especially by desperate and isolated States. But in general the opportunities for negotiated disarmament agreements, firmly focused on reinforcing security at lower levels of armaments, are now better than at any time in recent history.

In addition to the achievement of an indefinite ban on testing nuclear devices and contributing to an indefinite extension of the NPT, the Conference on Disarmament should have a role in the near term in making the biological weapons Convention an effective instrument by adding a verification regime and in negotiating an agreement (or at least guidelines) on reducing the flows of conventional arms. Seeking such an agreement now, or perhaps guidelines, may be propitious, as the world conventional arms sales market has been in decline since the late 1980s. A combination of supplier restraint on transfers of the most potent weapons with recipient restraint and increased transparency reflected in an expansion of the existing Register of Conventional Arms would be a very positive development. Such a cooperative relationship between suppliers and recipients would reflect the model embodied in, for instance, the chemical weapons Convention. In a related area, an expansion of the inhumane weapons Convention to cover, at least, non-self-disabling land-mines would be a very welcome humanitarian development and a useful boost towards conventional arms control.

There are two other areas of particular interest for Australia in the current arms control agenda: limits on the delivery systems for ballistic missiles and use of the environment as a weapon. Concerning delivery systems, the Missile Technology Control Regime offers short-term and limited-category supplier restraints. But it needs to be underpinned by a global agreement which creates norms adopted by the whole relevant international community. The CD's Ad Hoc Committee on outer space offers a forum for confidence-building measures (such as advance notification of space launches and

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

inspection of payloads) and for the globalization of existing measures (such as the INF treaties). It may also be a suitable forum for the compilation of regional or subregional understandings on restraint on (or even forswearing of acquisition of) advanced delivery systems.

The use of oil spills and the deliberate firing of oil wells by Iraq in the Gulf war illustrates that deliberately induced devastation on a grand scale is a real issue. Australia's vastness and varied climate and meteorological conditions lead naturally to our interest in the operations of the ENMOD Convention. We would join actively in the search to make its prohibitions clearer and more comprehensive.

The future arms control and disarmament agenda will require the elimination of cold war assumptions, the construction of a common approach to security on a basis of shared or highly congruent interests, and the search for mutually acceptable arrangements that break out of the typical cold war cycle of perceived threat and counter-reaction. Much of this activity will necessarily be on a regional or bilateral basis, but those regional arrangements are likely to build on norms and mechanisms set out in global agreements. In some cases such as a CTBT and other weapons of mass destruction, it seems likely that regional progress can only be achieved through a global resolution of the issue. The CTBT negotiations, even more than the CWC, have the potential to break out of East/West and North/South mindsets.

In order to fulfil its responsibilities, this Conference needs to refurbish itself by expanding its membership. The proposal I made on 2 September last year was based on several commonly agreed assumptions: that this would remain a body whose function was to negotiate arms control and disarmament agreements and where the rule of consensus would apply, and that therefore it should be of limited composition and that it should reflect the various political, economic and geographical elements commonly accepted in the international system. In discussing this approach with member States, it also became clear that an attempt to reconstruct the Conference by fundamentally altering its underlying balances was not what members wanted. Proposals for a very small expansion, or more recent ideas to add a small number to the list might not be capable of acceptance because they would not permit the maintenance of those underlying geographical, political and economic balances.

A key question in view of the statements made in plenary on 2 September 1993 and 10 February 1994 is whether any expansion is possible that does not include Iraq and Israel. I believe the answer is no. If this is so the key to expansion is a reversal of the existing barrier to the adoption of the package presented on 2 September 1993 or any subsequent agreed approach. To do this it is necessary to avoid importing artificial criteria that have nothing to do with the work of the CD, and to eschew linkage with considerations that take place in other bodies. In the matter of its own composition above all else, the CD should be the master of its own decision. If we want a reasonably near-term result, I believe a determined approach along these lines is necessary.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Finally, I would like to thank the Secretary-General, the deputy Secretary-General and members of the secretariat, the interpreters and other staff for their courtesy and efficiency. They have been of great assistance to me and my delegation.

As I leave the Conference after slightly more than three years' accreditation here, I would like to emphasize how much the Conference depends on a spirit of tolerance, civility and mutual respect. I would like to thank all my colleagues for their cooperation and support. I was lucky enough to be present when the Conference moved into a productive phase, and I look forward to hearing of its future accomplishments.

The PRESIDENT: I will not expose you to my French, and as German, which I speak rather fluently, is not a United Nations language, I will just say privately to you Danke sehr and I would like to thank you for your important statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Wagenmakers.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Congratulations to you, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffman, on the assumption of your duties as President of the Conference on Disarmament. The commitment of Germany to play its full part in the execution of the arms control and disarmament agenda of the 1990s is well known. I am sure that under your able leadership the CD will make tangible progress on the important issues of this year's business. I particularly hope that we can contribute successfully and practically to the enhancement of transparency in armaments, the issue I will address today. I thank Ambassador Errera of France for the spirited and determined way in which he guided and directed us during the starting phase of the 1994 CD session. Having listened to Ambassador O'Sullivan's peroration, I would like to pay tribute to the quality of the participation, the invariably high quality of our friends "down under". Specifically, I thank Paul O'Sullivan for his creative and dynamic contributions to our work and for his friendship. The Netherlands delegation wishes him well.

In my declaration of 27 January last, I gave the Netherlands' overall assessment of the first year of implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, entitled "Transparency in armaments". Today, I would like to dwell in some detail on the complementarity of the responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations Secretary-General and the Conference on Disarmament.

The Transparency in Armaments process faces an important year. In October 1993, for the first time, a United Nations Secretary-General's consolidated report on transparency in armaments (A/48/344) appeared. Together with its supplements, this report lists returns for calendar year 1992 submitted by 83 Member States to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This was a promising start, especially because all major arms suppliers reported and because a significant part, some 90 per cent, of the total number of inter-State arms transfers for the calendar year 1992 was covered.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

As for the second consolidated United Nations Secretary-General's report, which will contain returns pertaining to the calendar year 1993, more nations should participate to make the Register truly universal. All United Nations Member States are urged to report their imports and exports in 1993 of arms covered by the seven categories of the Register to the United Nations Secretary-General by 30 April 1994. If individual States have no imports or exports of arms to report, it is nevertheless important to file a "nil return" with the United Nations Secretary-General. All "nil return" is indicative of a nation's willingness to participate in the transparency drive. Submission of a "nil return" is an important political gesture.

The transparency process stands to benefit only if more than the roughly 30 States that have hitherto done so were to provide background information for the Register. Background information should relate to military holdings and procurement through national production, preferably covering the seven categories for arms transfers and following the model of the standardized reporting form used for transfers. Background information should further explain policies concerning arms transfers, and export policies, legislation and administrative procedures regarding the authorization of arms transfers and the prevention of illicit transfers.

Allow me to draw the attention of this Conference to the fact that, also in 1994, a Group of Governmental Experts established by the United Nations Secretary-General under paragraph 11 (b) of United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, has to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. With a view to enabling that New York Group to base its findings also on the returns by Member States over calendar year 1993, the above-mentioned deadline - 30 April 1994 - for those returns by Member States to the United Nations Register becomes all the more important.

A few words on the work of the 1994 Group of Governmental Experts. First, the mandate of the Group expects them to review the results of the Register in terms of ensuring its continuing operation. This means that the universal and non-discriminatory basis of the Register should be secured and that its overall objective be served. The objective is to enhance transparency, without prejudice to the security of Member States, and to help avoid destabilizing accumulations of arms. To that end the Group of Governmental Experts might recommend some slight procedural fixes to be applied to the standardized reporting form as well as some adjustments to existing categories.

The second task of the expert Group is to formulate recommendations on the further development of the Register. This concerns the possible addition of categories of equipment and expansion of the scope of the Register, for instance by including data on military holdings and procurement through national production. Follow-up action of the United Nations General Assembly on such recommendations will determine the Register's shape and impact for the foreseeable future. A recommendation for using the Register as an instrument for regional consultation and cooperation is another possibility to be considered.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

Also here in Geneva, 1994 will be an important year for transparency in armaments. The Conference on Disarmament has devoted the last two years to the necessary and fruitful exploration of this new subject. Specifically in 1993 CD delegations have invested in transparency in armaments by indicating national positions, and submitting working papers and practical proposals on the issue. This year we should try to turn these investments to profit by formulating concrete proposals for increasing openness and transparency in armaments. Such proposals will contribute to building confidence and trust among States and, consequently, will create greater stability, worldwide and regional.

The work of the CD is of direct relevance to the overall transparency process. The CD's responsibility for openness and transparency is neither restricted in time nor in place. The work of the CD is a continuous part of a "family of efforts". Work in Geneva and in New York is complementary: United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36 L provides for specific responsibilities of the Register on the one hand and of the Conference on Disarmament on the other. While, at least initially, the purpose of the Register is to increase openness and transparency in relation to conventional arms transfers, the CD has a wider, more general task.

The CD will fulfil its responsibility properly only if, under the rubric transparency, it designs and develops measures aimed at reducing and, hopefully, preventing aggravation of conflict situations. The CD should also provide inputs of practical use to the United Nations Register. Indeed, operative paragraph 11 (b) of resolution 46/36 L explicitly mentions that the 1994 Group of Governmental Experts should operate "taking into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament as set forth in paragraphs 12 to 15". In conformity with the global responsibility of the CD for openness and transparency it should be stressed that the application of measures designed and developed here can be both worldwide and regional.

In this respect I may be permitted to dwell for a moment on such measures as applied in my own region. The record of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) speaks for itself. The Stockholm CSBM Document of 1986 has been gradually expanded over the years. The present Vienna Document 1992 contains a wide range of confidence-building measures: an annual exchange of information on military organization, manpower and major weapons and equipment systems; the possibility of verifying that information during evaluation visits; a consultation mechanism for unusual military activities; a programme of visits (to air bases) and military contacts; and a communications system for speedy notifications between Foreign Ministries. At present negotiations about the further development of the Vienna Document continue.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the CFE Treaty, has also increased openness tremendously. In the Treaty ceilings on heavy weaponry (much like the first five categories of the United Nations Arms Register) have been agreed upon. These ceilings must be reached in November 1995, after a three-year reduction period, the first one having

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

transpired some time ago. After the first reduction year 17,000 pieces of equipment have been destroyed or converted. More than 1,000 on-site inspections have taken place, among them quite a number of challenge inspections. I can assure you that this large number of inspections contributes considerably to transparency in disarmament.

Numbers and technical data are important, particularly in the framework of the Register. The arms control measures we are supposed to elaborate here in the CD pertain to major weapons platforms, categories of weapons with a proven suitability for cross-border offensive actions, and not to small fry. These systems are relatively easy to identify, define, record and monitor. The elaboration by the CD of practical means to enhance openness and transparency does not need to be a technical and specialist operation. Our task is political. We are not here to excel in mathematics or statistics. Excruciating efforts to define precisely holdings, transfers and equipment will not fulfil our objectives. What we have to elaborate are practical, down-to-earth measures and designs that help neighbours to start trusting each other. Political commitment is a conditio sine qua non in building confidence and increasing stability.

What then are the practical consequences of the CD's responsibility pertaining to transparency in armaments for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on transparency during this year's CD session? The Netherlands delegation would like to offer a number of concrete suggestions.

The CD's Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments should enable the 1994 New York Group of Governmental Experts to take into account, inter alia, the work of the CD in preparing its report to the forty-ninth United Nations General Assembly, according to operative paragraph 11 (b) of resolution 46/36 L. At its first session the United Nations Secretary-General's Group as a whole felt that they should have sound knowledge of the CD's work on the issue. The Group therefore urged its Chairman to write to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments to draw the latter's attention to this CD responsibility, which has important consequences for the Ad Hoc Committee's work this year. The input of the CD would give a useful dimension to the work of the Group in New York. Specifically, views of the CD on practical means to increase openness and transparency related to excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms, military holdings and procurement through national production will be of direct relevance to both the Group and the Register. Consequently, at its second session, starting 31 May 1994, the New York Group should have at its disposal some reflection of the CD's work on transparency in armaments.

In view of the request for a CD contribution, initiated and supported by the whole Group of Governmental Experts, it is regrettable that no consensus has yet been achieved here on the draft work programme of the CD's Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. For me it is hard to conceive how between delegations of one and the same Member State opinions on the same issue can differ so much across the ocean.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

As far as the CD's responsibility in the wider framework of transparency in armaments is concerned, my concrete suggestions for action are largely based on existing proposals, submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments in 1993. The CD should elaborate these proposals with a view to developing confidence-building measures. As was put forward by the Ad Hoc Committee's Chairman, Ambassador György Boytha, new proposals are of course to be encouraged.

In the conventional field the following subjects for confidence-building measures present themselves: declarations on the size and organization of armed forces (a British proposal); declarations on the closure or conversion of military production facilities (an Italian proposal); international data exchange of military holdings and procurement through national production (a United States proposal); complementary regional measures to enhance transparency in armaments (a Japanese proposal); and a code of conduct, a Polish suggestion, yet to be elaborated. Similar ideas were brought to the fore by Ireland, New Zealand and Romania to bring about voluntary restraint and responsibility in conventional arms transfers.

The CD's Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments can certainly do useful work on the acute problem posed by the present-day use of anti-personnel land-mines. This question has both political and humanitarian dimensions. In the view of the Netherlands delegation, the attention of the multilateral arms control community is warranted. We are all aware of recent initiatives, expressed in resolutions during the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly last year. Now the CD is seized of this issue, as is the United Nations Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. There is, however, a slight danger that the well-intended efforts might slightly suffer from fragmentation and lack of focus. Without prejudice to the ultimate forum to be chosen, what the Ad Hoc Committee can do at least is work towards a consensus view on the proper parameters for action.

The CD's mandate further includes the elaboration of practical means to increase openness and transparency related to weapons of mass destruction. Discussions in the CD on this contentious issue are still in a preliminary phase. It seems useful to make a distinction here between transfers on the one hand and holdings and procurement on the other. As to transfers, I underline that after the entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention - to be expected in about a year's time - there will exist a coherent interlocking network of international agreements prohibiting any transfer of any weapon of mass destruction. As for holdings and procurement of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty recognizes the existence of five nuclear-weapon States. All other holdings and procurement of nuclear weapons is prohibited by international law. The Geneva Protocol, the chemical weapons Convention and the biological weapons Convention between them prohibit any design, possession, production and use of chemical and biological weapons respectively.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

Now, the basic assignment of the Conference on Disarmament seems to be to see to it that the transparency process would in due course yield comprehensive data and information on military outlays as well as on aggregate military force structures. This is certainly a long haul. It should not be forgotten, however, that a good deal of information on nuclear holdings is already in the public domain. For instance, the full texts of treaties like START and START II are issued as documents of the CD, and are thus widely disseminated. These texts provide information on the size of the nuclear arsenals of the two States concerned.

Important support for making progress is to be derived from the almost universal adherence to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system. Regional arrangements, like the Euratom Treaty, and zones free of nuclear weapons or nuclear-free zones, such as the ones established by the recently reinforced Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga, are further invaluable mechanisms conducive to a general environment of cooperative security and trust. The same holds true, *mutatis mutandis*, for the brand-new Convention on chemical weapons, with its innovative verification provisions.

It is now for us here in the Conference on Disarmament to capitalize further on what has already been achieved. As additional practical means to increase openness and transparency in nuclear matters, one could think of a confidence-building measure under which nuclear-weapon States might voluntarily supply more information on their nuclear arms holdings and the scale of the reductions of those holdings. A policy of transparency could also be developed with regard to plutonium stocks. This could ease the future elaboration of a "cut-off" treaty, which would definitely be another step along the way indicated in article VI of the NPT. Recommendations for advance notification of major military manoeuvres involving nuclear arms might be agreed upon here in the CD.

Resolution 46/36 L further requests the CD to address the issue of transfers of high technology with military applications. While elaborating the practical means requested by the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament may establish that export controls are a necessary complement to international agreements prohibiting transfers or the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. States that do abide by the international commitments appertaining thereto have no reason to worry about export control regimes.

Allow me to sum up. I am convinced that the CD can develop valuable recommendations for concrete measures to increase openness and transparency, on the basis of the above-mentioned and other, additional, proposals. It is a "family of efforts" which contributes to the success of the transparency in armaments' exercise now an object of consensus. These efforts are intended to encourage responsibility and self-restraint. The overall objective is cooperative security. In this way disarmament and international security are truly approached in an integrated manner. At the national level, the prospect is held out of reallocation of scarce socio-economic resources, without detriment to the security of member States. And it is in a secure environment that investment flourishes.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

There are meaningful patterns of action which the CD and its Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments can develop to further transparency with regard to holdings and procurement through national production. Furthermore, in extending, in a tangible fashion, the transparency concept to the development of parallel measures, both in the domain of weapons of mass destruction and with regard to transfers of high technology with military applications, the CD will be executing the mandate entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly to the full. Thus conceived and perceived, the transparency drive, and - for that matter - the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as an integral part of it, will come to fruition. In short, the CD can achieve much for the security of us all.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his wide-ranging statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, I also wish to welcome you to the presidency of the Conference and to express my confidence that the CD will benefit greatly from your leadership. I would fully agree with you laudatory comments to your predecessor, Ambassador Errera. I think the Conference can be justifiably grateful to him for guiding it through the difficult first weeks of this year's session. I also want to join others in paying tribute to Ambassador O'Sullivan for his vital role in the Conference during his three years here, especially regarding the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention and his efforts leading up to the historic negotiations we are now beginning on a CTBT. Let me say that his intellectual capacities and devotion to progress on these and other important issues will be sorely missed.

I am taking the floor today to give a brief description of my approach to the consultations which I have been requested to carry out on "the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". I also wish to give examples of the types of questions I will be asking delegations in the course of these consultations so they may reflect and consult with their authorities if necessary. Before I do so, I would like to thank all delegations for this honour which they have conferred upon me and my country; I shall make every possible effort to live up to your expectations.

As we all know, proposals for a cut-off convention have been made for at least two decades. These proposals were made to stop the ever-growing production of fissile material, thus stopping the potential to transform such material into nuclear explosive devices. Such a concept would contribute positively, in the minds of many, to nuclear disarmament. Others consider that these proposals are further building blocks towards the construction of a non-proliferation regime. These views have evolved over time and the geo-political changes of the 1990s have made it possible to achieve a political consensus on the need to negotiate a convention on what is known in this context as "cut-off".

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

In spite of the complexity of the issues involved, and the different objectives that are undoubtedly sought by various States, it is certainly worth our while to try to find agreement as to how we should proceed. If we agree broadly on a common approach, we should take advantage of the new consensus as expressed at the last United Nations General Assembly to start negotiations on a convention on cut-off. Perhaps the best way of proceeding is to look for the forests before we look for the trees. By that I mean I propose to sketch out a series of categories and questions to try to begin to penetrate the issues involved. What follows is not intended to be an exhaustive listing; other questions will arise as we proceed. To that end, I would ask all delegations to apprise me of significant areas that have been omitted or that might benefit from further clarification.

The United Nations General Assembly resolution (48/75 L of 16 December 1993) recommended the negotiation of a cut-off treaty in the most appropriate international forum. Delegations will be asked their preferences on the most appropriate arrangement for such a negotiation, the forum and, assuming it takes place in the Conference on Disarmament, the mandate and timing for such a negotiation. I will also try to assess whether there is a need to improve our technical knowledge base, and, in that context, whether there is a requirement for an experts group. The United Nations General Assembly resolution also asked IAEA to provide assistance for the examination of verification arrangements as and when required, and I will be seeking views on this aspect as well. In addition, in order to have a framework for the possible negotiation of a cut-off convention, I plan to seek the views of delegations on some substantive issues of a treaty. To that end, I will seek comments on the scope, verification and structure (i.e. whether it would stand alone or be somehow linked to the International Atomic Energy Agency).

These are the main questions that come to my mind as I embark on this mission. I intend to consult with all delegations that wish to put their views forward on this important matter. For the time being I propose to proceed on a bilateral basis. Once I feel comfortable that most of the views have been aired, I will call meetings to share my preliminary conclusions and allow for a debate before drafting my report, which I understand I must give before the end of this session. I trust that I will find the support of all delegations for the approach sketched above.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Shannon, for your report on where you stand with your consultations and on what you intend to do, and also for your kind words addressed to the Chair. I am sure that all members of the Conference will be supportive of your efforts and try their utmost to answer your pertinent and not impertinent questions.

This concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none. Then let us continue as I had envisaged.

I would now like to invite the Conference to consider the requests for participation in our work from Ecuador and the former Yugoslav Republic of

(The President)

Macedonia. The secretariat has distributed today a note from the President containing these requests (CD/WP.453). During the consultations I have been holding, there has been no objection to these requests. In the circumstances, I propose that we adopt the recommendation contained in document CD/WP.453 directly in plenary, it being understood that this does not constitute a precedent for future occasions when an informal meeting might be necessary. May I take it that the Conference takes a decision to this effect? I give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation.

Mr. ZEMSKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Before we take a decision on this matter, I would like to clarify under what name the Republic of Macedonia - this is the name under which Russia granted recognition - is prepared to join our Conference as an observer. Will it be ready to join as "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"? Have we clarified the position regarding this country?

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for this question. It is clear that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will take its place in this Conference under the name of "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". This is the United Nations practice that we will follow in the CD. Any further questions? If this is not the case, may I take it that we are all agreed?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: This concludes our work for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 3 March 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV. 673
3 March 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 March 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wolfgang Hoffmann (Germany)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 673rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and my own, to the Director-General for Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry of Austria, Ambassador Hohenfellner, who will be our first speaker today.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Austria and Sri Lanka, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, who will introduce the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group on its thirty-seventh session, which has been circulated as document CD/1245, as well as the representatives of Japan, the United States of America and France.

It gives me great pleasure to give the floor to the representative of Austria, a good and old friend of ours, the Director-General for Political Affairs in Vienna, Ambassador Hohenfellner.

Mr. HOHENFELLNER (Austria): Mr. President, first of all, I would like to congratulate you on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and welcome in you not only a very good friend but also the representative of Germany, a neighbouring country to which we are bound by many friendly ties. We also remember with great pleasure the time you were Ambassador of your country in the Austrian capital, Vienna. I would equally like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Errera of France, who very skilfully managed to organize the take-off of this year's session. We also welcome the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, also a good friend, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, as the new Secretary-General of the Conference. His experience as former Under-Secretary-General responsible for disarmament affairs will certainly further enhance the work of this Conference. Last but not least we also congratulate Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, whose merits we had already stressed in this forum a year ago, for having been appointed to the important function of Deputy Secretary-General of the CD.

The fogs of uncertainty which obscured last year's CD session have by now risen. On 10 August 1993, the Conference on Disarmament, by deciding to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty, has now set itself a new and important goal. On 25 January this year, the direction was further clarified by the adoption of a well-defined mandate for the CTBT negotiations and, finally, on 1 February, a consensus could be reached on the designation of a successor to Ambassador Tanaka as Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee.

We congratulate also an old friend Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico for having been elected to chair this very important committee as a former student of Nobel Peace Prize winner Alfonso García Robles. In the same year when García Robles graduated in international law, the Nobel Prize for Physics was awarded to the Austrian scientist Victor Franz Hess, who, after World War II, strongly opposed nuclear tests. Hess's research principally dealt with radioactivity and atmospheric electricity. It brought him eventually to the

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study of radioactive fallout from nuclear bombs. Symbolizing the legal and scientific endeavours to be undertaken in the working groups explicitly foreseen by the NTB mandate, these two brilliant personalities stand for the genuine search for peace which ought always to prevail over military considerations.

The end of the cold war has brought with it a whole set of far-reaching measures in the field of nuclear disarmament: treaties like START II, in which the United States of America and the Russian Federation agreed to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads by more than 70 per cent, would not have been achieved without the sweeping changes of recent years. These profound changes in world affairs have set the wider political framework for nuclear disarmament and arms control. Now, after the political thaw which permitted a number of formerly "frozen" topics to surface, the international community sees itself confronted by an impressive negotiation package on nuclear issues. This package will require careful handling, lest it falls apart. It is composed of the following elements: the already mentioned CD negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban; the review conference foreseen in article VIII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the extension conference foreseen by article X of the same treaty, which will be held together with the review conference in April/May 1995; the forthcoming negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and, finally, the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, referred to as the Ad Hoc Committee on "negative security assurances".

While some countries stress that no positive outcome could be expected from the 1995 NPT review and extension conference unless substantial progress is achieved on a CTBT and the so-called "negative security assurances" negotiations, other representatives point to the opposite, i.e. that no substantial progress will be made in the field of a CTBT, unless an indefinite extension of the NPT has been accepted by all States parties. Our minds rather ought to be focused on mutual benefit options encompassing the nuclear negotiation package as a whole, bearing in mind that the elements of this package have a mutual influence on each other. Since agreement would in any case not mean the end of the discussions on nuclear issues, but rather a new beginning, it seems to us to be wiser to pursue a partnership rather than a confrontational approach.

As for the Austrian priorities with regard to the issues to be tackled in the framework of the nuclear negotiation package, we start from an analysis which was incorporated in the preamble of the NPT itself: as a matter of fact, we do believe - and here I quote - "that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war". Hence, probability calculus applied to nuclear proliferation makes it evident to us that the more countries acquire nuclear strike capabilities, the higher is the nuclear threat. Therefore, the NPT remains for us the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime which ought to be both strengthened and extended indefinitely. In this context, I would like to reiterate the hope of my Government that the Ukrainian Parliament will agree to early ratification

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of the NPT so that Ukraine will be in a position to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. We were encouraged by the statement of Mr. Hryshchenko in this forum on 10 February 1994, informing us about the parliamentary authorization given to the Ukrainian President to exchange the instruments of ratification on START. We trust swift accession to the NPT will follow.

In our view, a CTBT should contribute to furthering the non-proliferation goals of the NPT, but this cannot remain the sole aim. The fact that nuclear test explosions can easily have serious consequences for people and their environment is a sufficient reason to ban them once and for all. Austria will make every effort to contribute to an early successful conclusion of these negotiations.

Nuclear non-proliferation would also significantly benefit from a multilateral and verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices. Negotiations on this subject should therefore start swiftly. Austria has already enacted a law on the establishment of a security control system, on the safeguarding of nuclear material and nuclear equipment and on export controls.

Finally, like almost all members of the international community, we recognize that effective measures and arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. We share your view that the demand for negative security assurances is a legitimate interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States. It goes without saying that we welcome Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium in the chair of the Ad Hoc Committee which has been entrusted with the task to move this matter forward. In the light of comments received we are now in the process of revising the provisions of our draft treaty text on negative security assurances.

We think that all nuclear arms control and disarmament issues are intrinsically interrelated. Therefore, we do not think that we should trade one particular subject for another, but rather hope that significant progress will be achieved on all aspects of the nuclear negotiation package.

We have noted with satisfaction that the expertise of IAEA is being increasingly used by the world community in many different situations. We are certain that the wealth of knowledge this organization has accumulated over the past 35 years will also be most valuable to a future CTBT verification regime. We think that such a verification regime could operate most efficiently and cost-effectively either entrusted to IAEA or - should this pose difficulties - in close proximity to IAEA.

At the end of my statement, I would like to take the opportunity of my presence in the Conference on Disarmament to address the subject of the expansion of this body. In this context, let me first express our appreciation for your two predecessors in the presidency whose excellent work has led us closer to the overdue resolution of this issue. I will not repeat here the reasons why we think that Austria deserves a place as a new member of

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this Conference, since my country has already been included in the list of States proposed for full membership. In any case, please be assured of our full support in your endeavours to achieve a breakthrough which, in our opinion, will have the best chances to happen if based on the report submitted last year to the Conference by Ambassador O'Sullivan.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Ambassador Hohenfellner, for your important statement and for the kind words you addressed to me and to my country. I give now the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Goonetilleke.

Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, this is the first time my delegation is taking the floor during the initial part of the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Permit me, therefore, to extend to you congratulations and best wishes of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency. My delegation is confident that you would successfully steer the work of the Conference in the coming weeks.

My delegation wishes to express its deep appreciation of your immediate predecessors Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt and Ambassador Gérard Errera of France for the excellent contributions to the Conference during their respective stewardships. Their deep commitment and devotion to the Conference was a source of satisfaction and inspiration to my delegation.

Let me also join the previous speakers in extending our greetings to Mr. Vladimir F. Petrovsky, on his appointment as the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Conference on Disarmament. Similarly, I am happy to offer congratulations of my delegation to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail on his appointment as new Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference.

I would like to welcome into our fold the new colleagues Ambassador Hocine Meghlaoui of Algeria, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau of Argentina, Ambassador Ibrahim Omar of Ethiopia, Ambassador Alessandro Vattani of Italy, Ambassador Tarre Murzi of Venezuela and Ambassador Bjoern Skogmo of Norway. We wish them a happy and fruitful stay in Geneva.

It would be a dereliction of my duty, if I fail to remember Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia who left the CD on 28 February. His contribution to the work of the Conference cannot be summed up in a few words. Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan will be remembered by us for the very substantial contribution he made during the CWC negotiations, and as Co-ordinator assigned with the function of the expansion of the CD membership.

Mr. President, my delegation was pleased to note the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to adopt the past year's pragmatic programme of work upon your recommendation, which would facilitate continuity of the deliberations of the Conference this year. It is the view of my delegation that the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the occasion of the inauguration of the 1994 session of the Conference, together

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with the Presidential statement on the agenda and organization of its work, constitutes an appropriate guide for the smooth and productive conduct of the work of the Conference.

Given its importance, my delegation would like to deal with the items on this year's agenda which are related to the main aspects of nuclear disarmament. One of the most important tasks that the Conference on Disarmament is called upon to fulfil during its current session is to commence immediate negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). The importance that the international community attaches to a CTBT is clearly seen from the fact that more than 150 Member States co-sponsored the United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/70, which urged the Conference on Disarmament "to proceed intensively, as a priority task, in its negotiation of such a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty". The trust and the confidence placed in the Conference by the General Assembly must be maintained.

In the discharge of the responsibilities entrusted to it, it is important for the CD to agree on a set of priorities to conduct its work. Most significant among them is the need to commence negotiations immediately and conduct those negotiations in all honesty and sincerity with a view to concluding them with the least possible delay. On our part, we support those delegations who expressed their desire to conclude negotiations during 1994. In this regard, my delegation is heartened to note that some delegations have already submitted draft structural outlines for a CTBT. It is the hope of my delegation that the CD would reach agreement on this matter soon, which will facilitate commencing our substantive work on a draft treaty.

We should not begin our negotiations with a preconceived notion that one group of countries - either the nuclear-weapon States or, for that matter, the non-nuclear-weapon States - is making concessions to the other group. This is a common endeavour, and its final outcome would be to the benefit of the present and future generations.

An equally important factor is the need to continue current nuclear test moratoria. The nuclear-weapon States should permit CTBT negotiations to be conducted in an atmosphere devoid of nuclear-weapon tests. While welcoming the example-setting call made by the United States Administration to other nuclear-weapon States, we urge those States (NWS) to facilitate negotiations by not undertaking nuclear tests during this crucial period.

In the course of the first part of this session so far, many delegations have expressed their views in regard to major aspects of a CTBT. My delegation would welcome a draft CTBT to embody the following elements.

A clear and unambiguous definition of what constitutes nuclear testing. Several delegations have expressed the view that the definition contained in article I of the 1963 PTBT, which covers "any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion", is a basis for the CD to proceed on this matter. Indeed, this formulation provides us with a base to start our work on the definition.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

My delegation shares the view expressed by several delegations that the CTBT should be comprehensive in scope, and it should ban all nuclear tests in all environments for all time.

The treaty should cover all types of nuclear tests, both for military and peaceful purposes. We recognize the fact that non-military nuclear explosions could be conducted to achieve certain engineering and scientific benefits. However, due to a variety of factors, including economic reasons and growing public awareness and objections, not much progress has been reached in the field of peaceful nuclear explosions. Despite the fact that the NPT provides for and even encourages maximization of benefits from peaceful explosions, the difficulty is in relation to a distinction between a peaceful explosion and an explosion meant for military applications. With a treaty banning nuclear-weapons tests, the urge to seek military benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions would be quite considerable. We should, therefore, not provide for tests which are described as explosions for peaceful purposes, as such tests could be used to obtain weapons-related information.

In its application and verification, the treaty should be non-discriminatory for all participants. Verification should be international in character and geared to effective monitoring and compliance using seismic and non-seismic monitoring and on-site inspection. In view of the high cost of monitoring, care should be taken to ensure that the verification regime is cost-effective and for this purpose due consideration should be given as to how such a regime could utilize existing international mechanisms, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

One of the most important aspects worthy of mention falls into the realm of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The PTBT should not be used as a pretext to deny the non-nuclear-weapon countries, particularly the NPT countries, their right of access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as has been provided for in article IV of the NPT. The apprehensions expressed by developing countries during the CWC negotiations and indeed after the signing of the Convention should be borne in mind in addressing the task of drafting the treaty.

These are but a few areas which the Conference has to focus on, in the coming months. Given our experience with the CWC, it is only normal to expect further inputs by interested delegations to facilitate the Conference in the task of carrying out its mandate. The current co-operative international environment facilitated by the end of the cold war politics affords the Conference a golden opportunity to negotiate a treaty banning all nuclear tests. We should seize this window of opportunity to conduct our negotiations in an expeditious manner. As the United States President Clinton himself recently observed, "This challenging, but crucial, objective is the Conference's top priority". I would like to assure you and members of the CD of our full support and cooperation towards the realization of this objective, hopefully by December 1994.

Although not directly linked, yet related to the subject of CTBT, are issues connected to non-proliferation. Being one of the first signatories from the South Asian region, Sri Lanka has an abiding interest in the NPT.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

With over 150 States parties, the NPT is by far the most widely adhered to of all arms control agreements. As we come closer to its 1995 review and extension conference, we ought to take a dispassionate view of the Treaty and look into the shortcomings of its implementation so far and address them fairly and squarely. Above all, we have to recognize the fact that since the entry into force of the NPT, many a country has crossed the threshold and acquired nuclear-weapons capability. Against this background, we should take all measures within our means to secure universal adherence to, and compliance with, the convention. Equally important is for nuclear-weapon States (NWS) not to seek to use the Conference merely to tighten horizontal proliferation. The nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate their good will by taking effective steps to take deeper cuts into vertical proliferation and also live up to the commitments made under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Sri Lanka wishes to see the successful conclusion of the fifth NPT review and extension conference. We also wish to see the non-members, particularly those who have crossed the nuclear threshold, or about to cross it, joining the NPT with the least delay. Given the importance of securing the participation of the threshold countries in the NPT regime, we should leave no avenues unexplored in order to ensure their speedy accession to the Treaty.

In this regard, I wish to thank wholeheartedly all those members of the Conference on Disarmament for their unanimous endorsement of Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala for the presidency of the fifth NPT review and extension conference scheduled for April - May 1995. Ambassador Dhanapala is too well-known to the CD to be introduced. Members of the CD are well aware of his competence, diplomatic skills, impartiality and above all his high sense of devotion to the multifaceted subject of disarmament. I am confident that he will discharge his duties as the President of the review and extension conference to the utmost satisfaction of the States members of the NPT, that they so richly deserve, by virtue of their unanimous support of him.

Agenda item 5 of the Conference, "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", is another important subject to which my delegation attaches great importance. As the United Nations Secretary-General in his message to the Conference remarked, "admittedly, the best guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth". It is true that we cannot disinvent nuclear weapons, for what is done cannot be undone. However, prohibition of nuclear weapons, as in the case of chemical weapons, is not beyond the realm of possibility. It is attainable within our means. What is required to achieve this noble objective is the same political will that was amply demonstrated in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention. Future generations might yet question why the leaders of nuclear-weapon States failed to display sufficient courage and wisdom to outlaw this category of weapons, when such a measure was within their grasp at the tail end of the twentieth century.

While the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains our ultimate objective, until that is achieved, it is imperative that the international community adopt effective and binding international arrangements to assure

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non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those who have acceded to the NPT, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We share the view expressed by many delegations that negative security assurances (NSA) should be provided through a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding international agreement, rather than through declarations of a unilateral character. As we have pointed out on previous occasions, there is no justification, whatsoever, for the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those who have become parties to the NPT, to live under a perpetual cloud of nuclear annihilation. Guarantees on the part of nuclear-weapons States will constitute a positive confidence-building measure among nations of the world, and help remove the great psychological burden of the well-founded apprehensions and suspicions entertained by non-nuclear-weapon States. Against this background, it is not out of place for my delegation to express its hope that, as we proceed in the direction of a CTBT, the Conference on Disarmament would also work towards an international agreement on NSA with the same tenacity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ola Dahlman, to introduce the Group's progress report on its thirty-seventh session.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I do appreciate this opportunity to present the results of the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group and to introduce its progress report contained in document CD/1245, which has been circulated. This session was held from 7 to 18 February and experts and representatives from 29 countries participated. The Group enjoyed throughout the session the eminent services of the secretariat.

The Group's session was focused on the planning and the preparation of its forthcoming large-scale technical test, referred to as GSETT-3. As you may recall the objectives of GSETT-3 are to: develop and test new concepts for an international seismic monitoring system, building upon previous experience; to provide a practical basis upon which to furnish the Conference on Disarmament with timely technical information; and to develop an experimental system that can evolve and adapt to support future requirements that may be set forth by the Conference on Disarmament.

This extensive global experiment could provide the nuclear test ban Committee with more specific information relating to a future international seismic monitoring system (ISMS), as follows. The station network designed for GSETT-3 could provide a basis for the final design of the ISMS. The functions and products which have been designed for the experimental International Data Centre could be a guide to the functions and products required from the ISMS. The detailed instructions and procedures developed for GSETT-3 could provide a good foundation for an operating manual for the components of the ISMS. The hardware and software developed at the experimental IDC which is being established in Washington, D.C. and at existing and new seismological stations, and the experience gained by system operators around the world, would provide a valuable infrastructure that could facilitate the rapid implementation of the ISMS. The results and experience which will be obtained as GSETT-3 evolves could be used in modifying the system design and in estimating system capabilities, staffing requirements and

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

operating instructions of the ISMS. And finally, GSETT-3 could provide valuable information on costs associated with the establishment and operation of the ISMS.

The Ad Hoc Group established at its session in August 1993 three working groups to facilitate the planning, the operation and the evaluation of GSETT-3. Based on documents prepared by these working groups the GSE undertook in-depth consideration of the various aspects of GSETT-3. As a result of the efforts of the working groups, substantial progress has been made regarding the preparations for GSETT-3. Particularly noteworthy is the rapid progress in establishing and starting operations at the IDC. Plans for conducting and evaluating GSETT-3 have been developed in considerable detail and an outline has been established for the extensive documentation needed for the experiment. There are, however, some areas of concern, as noted by these working groups. Few countries have so far provided stations for the ongoing tests; this may delay the testing of procedures at the IDC. If the desired participation is not obtained before the end of the year this might put the whole test in jeopardy. The successful operation of the IDC during GSETT-3 depends on supports from participating countries for both software and personnel. A plan was presented for involvement of personnel from a number of countries in the operation of the IDC, thus obtaining international staffing of that important facility. Significant contributions from experts and national data centres in the participating countries are needed for the evaluation of GSETT-3. More detailed summaries of the present work in the working groups are annexed to the progress report.

I would like to emphasize the importance of securing adequate participation in GSETT-3. Obtaining a station network with good global coverage is essential to meet the objectives of GSETT-3. Although some countries have, during the last two weeks, made valuable commitments of important stations, still only 19 of the 53 stations selected for the primary, or alpha, network have been provided by their host country. It is therefore most important that a number of countries, most of which are CD members or observers support GSETT-3 by providing the desired stations. A summary of the countries from which commitments are needed to obtain adequate station coverage during GSETT-3 is annexed to the progress report. The Ad Hoc Group appreciates the offer by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to assist in obtaining a wider participation in GSETT-3. In addition to contributing seismic stations, a country might participate by providing a national data centre or personnel to support the operation of the IDC or in the evaluation process. Countries may also, through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, provide technical and financial assistance to other countries whose participation is essential.

The current plans call for the full-scale tests to begin by 1 January 1995. A schedule to meet this goal is given in the progress report. It is difficult to assess, at this time, the ultimate duration of commitments needed for GSETT-3. For financial planning purposes, countries participating in GSETT-3 should, however, be prepared to support their national facilities and their communication links for a minimum of one year after the start of the full-scale experiment on 1 January 1995.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

As previously noted, the infrastructure of the international seismic monitoring system is flexible enough to incorporate the collection, archiving and distribution of data also from non-seismic techniques, for example radioactivity, hydroacoustics and infrasound. During the session the Group received two national reports on networks for monitoring radionuclides in the atmosphere.

The Ad Hoc Group noted with appreciation the convening of three informal technical meetings since its previous session. During 9-11 August 1993, Finland hosted an informal workshop in Helsinki on the issue of seismic detection methods. On 2 November 1993, the United States hosted a tour and an informal demonstration for CD ambassadors of the facilities of the experimental International Data Centre (IDC) being developed for GSETT-3 in Washington, D.C. During 10-14 November 1993, Italy hosted a workshop in Erice, Sicily on planning and procedures for GSETT-3.

The Ad Hoc Group received and appreciated a briefing by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The Group agreed to invite the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee's Working Group on Verification to its next sessions. The Ad Hoc Group received a request from the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to provide a report summarizing the knowledge and experience on the upcoming GSETT-3. The report should contain elaborations on the overall concept of GSETT-3, the functions and components of such a system and matters of organization and cost. In order to be timely for the Ad Hoc Committee it was requested that the report be presented to the committee on 23 and 25 March 1994. The Ad Hoc Group appointed a small group to prepare a draft of such a report to be presented in layman's language so that it can be directly used in the work of the NTB Committee and its Working Group on Verification.

To finalize the requested report and present it to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and its Working Group on Verification, the Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 21 to 25 March in Geneva. Thereafter the Group envisages to meet early in the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, at a date to be agreed upon during the March session, to continue its preparation for GSETT-3.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Dahlman, for introducing the progress report in document CD/1245. You will notice that the progress report contains, in paragraph 14, a suggestion to the effect that the next session of the Group be convened from 21 to 25 March 1994 in Geneva, to finalize its report summarizing the activities of the Group in the context of GSETT-3 and present it to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Therefore, at our next plenary meeting on 10 March, I shall put to you for approval the recommendation concerning the proposed dates (i.e. 21-25 March 1994) for the next meeting of the Ad Hoc Group. So we will decide on this at our next meeting.

I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Mr. Kunieda.

Mr. KUNIEDA (Japan): As my delegation is taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, let me, at the outset, congratulate you, Mr. President, on behalf of the Japanese delegation, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference, and assure you of our full cooperation.

Today I have taken the floor to address a problem which the GSE faces in its preparation for GSETT-3. My delegation thanks Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the GSE, for the report which he has just presented to the Conference and wishes to avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our appreciation for the work of the GSE conducted under the able guidance of Dr. Dahlman.

In this report there are the following references, in its sixth paragraph, to the problem of the lack of sufficient commitments for GSETT-3:

"The Ad Hoc Group expressed grave concern over the lack of commitments of participation of seismological facilities and stations to meet the objectives of GSETT-3. A good global distribution of seismographic stations and communications from these stations to the International Data Centre are essential to the success of the GSETT-3.

"... Countries can participate in GSETT-3 by contributing seismic facilities in their countries, by establishing communication links from these facilities to the International Data Centre, by participation of national data centres and by contributing to the evaluation process. In some cases, bilateral and multilateral cooperation will be important. Countries can also assist by providing technical and financial assistance in these areas to other countries whose participation is essential."

Please look at page 8, that is the second page of Annex I of the report, to identify the countries which we are talking about.

Accordingly, my delegation echoes the appeals made by the Chairman of the GSE and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to those countries whose participation is indispensable for successful operations of GSETT-3, to commit themselves to the important experiment which is expected to form a basis for the verification system of a future CTBT. If the countries in question have not yet expressed the commitment at this stage simply because of the delay in the decision-making process, we will urge them to decide quickly. If there are any other reasons for the difficulty in making the commitment, we should discuss them and seek a solution. We are looking forward to hearing soon positive responses to our appeal, which, we consider, is indeed a serious appeal of the Conference on Disarmament as a whole.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his kind words addressed to the Chair and also for his statement urging, inter alia, Germany to do something. If I heard the last words correctly, he also offers Japanese assistance in financial terms.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, please accept also my congratulations. The United States delegation will assist your efforts at this busy time.

I take the floor to acknowledge and endorse the excellent report that Dr. Ola Dahlman has introduced on the recent meeting of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE). I think we are all pleased that preparations for GSETT-3 are well under way, and we attach great importance to this seismic experiment. The GSE report provides important details about the experiment's schedule and preparation.

I would also stress the importance of wide participation in the upcoming GSETT-3 experiment. Delegations in this room can contribute to a successful experiment, but participation across each hemisphere is extremely important. A good global distribution of both alpha and beta seismographic stations and communications from these stations to the International Data Centre are essential to the success of the GSETT-3.

The recent GSE session saw several opportunities for valuable exchanges between the GSE and the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee. The upcoming report by the GSE to the verification Working Group on the overall concept of an international seismic monitoring system and the implementation of such a system in the GSETT-3 experiment should provide the working group with pertinent information. Both bodies have much to gain by interaction and discussion.

Finally, there has been some concern raised about a proposal by the GSE to study how the GSETT-3 data exchange system might be used for the collection, processing and distribution of data from monitoring systems other than seismic. It seems to make sense to my delegation to develop to the extent possible, a single data exchange system to handle all types of data. We should not rule out thinking about how this would be done.

The United States believes that the GSE should consider and discuss how to transmit, process, archive, retrieve, and distribute other types of data, such as data collected by some system of internationally or nationally operated radionuclide samplers, and hydroacoustic and acoustic and possibly other sensors. But, such consideration must be guided by the pace of work in the verification Working Group and must not detract from the GSE's priority task - the implementation of the GSETT-3 experiment.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Mr. Besancenot.

Mr. BESANCENOT (France) (translated from French): Allow me first of all to congratulate you warmly on behalf of the French delegation on your taking up the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. We are sure that in your hands the Conference will make active progress in its work, and you know you can count on the full cooperation of the French delegation.

(Mr. Besancenot, France)

My delegation would like to thank Dr. Dahlman for introducing the report on the thirty-seventh session of the Group of Scientific Experts. It values the work done on this occasion and endorses the proposals made in the document. Nevertheless, there is a recommendation which my delegation is not in a position to approve: the recommendation in the third subparagraph of paragraph 11 that the Group of Scientific Experts should study how the GSETT-3 data exchange system might be used for non-seismic monitoring techniques.

In its statement in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on 14 February, my delegation clearly indicated that the principal task of the Group of Scientific Experts should, in its view, be to prepare for the full-scale international seismic monitoring network test known as GSETT-3. Accordingly, the issue of synergy between the various means of detection, and in particular the possibility that the means of communication and the data bank planned for the seismic network might be used for the benefit of other - non-seismic - monitoring techniques, should be examined by the Committee only at a later stage. Logic dictates that the Committee should first define the various components it deems essential for developing a credible verification system, before addressing ways and means of optimizing complementarity between these different means of monitoring.

In this context, my delegation does not of course rule out the possibility that the Group of Scientific Experts may subsequently be entrusted with the task of studying how the GSETT-3 data exchange system might be used for other non-seismic monitoring techniques; but it cannot endorse the proposal contained in the report of the thirty-seventh session of the Group that this should be one of the functions of the Group of Experts at this stage.

My delegation wishes the Group of Experts to take this position into account, failing which it could not accept the recommendations contained in the report of its thirty-seventh session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his kind words addressed to me and for his intervention that will certainly be taken note of. I now would like to give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency. Your ability to crack the whip with charm and good humour has been demonstrated in several Chairs both here and in New York since you joined the CD. We enjoy seeing you performing in the Chair of the Conference itself.

I should like to congratulate Dr. Dahlman on his report and to thank him for it. My delegation attaches great importance to the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and in particular to the work it is doing on GSETT-3. In our view nothing should be allowed to divert the Group's attention from their work on this. We note with satisfaction from paragraph 9 of the report that the Group is indeed concentrating on this aspect of its work. I should just like to make two comments. First, the establishment of the proposed GSETT-3 network is of paramount importance to the work of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. I

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

understand that not all the States on whose territory it is proposed to operate an alpha station have yet committed the necessary resources to participate in GSETT. We urge that those States who are not yet committed consider, as a matter of some urgency, their willingness to participate and allocate the necessary resources as soon as possible, so that the GSETT-3 network can be fully evaluated. Secondly, in the view of my delegation, it is sensible for the GSE to be in a position to respond to requests from the NTB Ad Hoc Committee or from its verification Working Group. We believe, however, that the direction is best provided by the verification Working Group. Early in the next part of this session, we will have, I am sure, a clearer idea of the verification needs of the CTBT. If the proposed International Data Centre is to play a major role in processing and archiving the data, they will need to know what volume of data from other monitoring systems could be expected, and how this should be handled to meet the needs of the treaty in the best possible way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for his statement and his kind words. Now I would like again to give the floor to the representative of Japan.

Mr. KUNIEDA (Japan): Mr. President, I thank you for granting me the floor for a second time today. With respect to paragraph 11 of the GSE report, which is, like other paragraphs, a result of discussions of the GSE, the Japanese delegation supports its contents and appreciates the Group for its decision to include this in its report. This is because, in our view, the GSETT-3 data exchange system, in particular the experimental International Data Centre, might also be used for the collection, processing and distribution of data from other monitoring techniques. Therefore, as long as the GSE is willing and able to study this possibility, we don't have to discourage them from doing this and, indeed, we should encourage them to proceed in that direction.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his intervention. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? This does not seem to be the case.

I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it. I give the floor to the representative of Belgium.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, I merely wish to say that the meeting scheduled for Thursday afternoon will be held at 3.30 p.m., and that also applies to this afternoon's meeting.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. We take note of this changed schedule for today and for next Thursday: NSA meeting at 3.30 p.m. I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Sir Michael WESTON: (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I just have a question. I think it was proposed during the meeting of the extended Bureau of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee that if there was to be a meeting of that extended Bureau, then in future it would be shown on the timetable. Am I to assume that the fact that it is not so shown means that the meeting which I thought was arranged for 9.30 on the morning of 9 March is now not going to take place?

The PRESIDENT: You may not, because the meeting will take place as pre-arranged. The NTB Committee will have an extended Bureau meeting, next Wednesday, 9 March at 9.30 a.m. in room I.

So with these explanations can we adopt the timetable? This seems to be the case.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our work for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 10 March 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.